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Lead Plaintiff Incentives in Aggregate
Litigation
Charles R. Korsmo*
Minor Myers**
The lead plaintiff role holds out considerable promise in promoting the
deterrence and compensation goals of aggregate litigation. The prevailing
approach to compensating lead plaintiffs, however, provides no real incentive
for a lead plaintiff to bring claims on behalf of a broader group. The policy
challenge is to induce sophisticated parties to press claims not in their
individual capacity but instead in a representative capacity, conferring a
positive externality on all class members by identifying attractive claims,
financing ongoing litigation, and managing the work of attorneys. We outline
what an active and engaged lead plaintiff could add to the civil enforcement
regime and propose a set of reforms designed induce that engagement. In
particular, we argue that courts should be open to awarding lead plaintiffs
amounts that are roughly equal in magnitude to those awarded to lead counsel.
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INTRODUCTION
The traditional model of representative litigation places the
plaintiffs’ attorney squarely in the center of the universe. They act as
“private attorneys general,” dedicating their resources and expertise to
vindicating claims on behalf of disaggregated plaintiffs.1 In most cases,
the plaintiffs’ attorney decides when to bring class claims, how to
manage them, and how to settle them—subject to court approval.2
These efforts generate public benefits, promoting compensation and the
deterrence of wrongdoing,3 and so the law creates an incentive for
plaintiffs’ attorneys to undertake those efforts in the first place,
rewarding them with a substantial percentage of the recovery
generated for the class.4 While this award is often referred to as an
“attorneys’ fee,” it has more in common with a reward or a qui tam
payment than with a traditional attorneys’ fee negotiated with a paying
client.5 The actual lead or named plaintiff is a peripheral figure, at
best.6 With only a small stake in the litigation, the lead plaintiff is

1.
See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Rescuing the Private Attorney General: Why the Model of the
Lawyer as Bounty Hunter Is Not Working, 42 MD. L. REV. 215, 216 (1983); William B. Rubenstein,
On What a “Private Attorney General” Is—and Why It Matters, 57 VAND. L. REV. 2129, 2148 (2004).
2.
See, e.g., Charles R. Korsmo & Minor Myers, The Structure of Stockholder Litigation:
When Do the Merits Matter?, 75 OHIO ST. L.J. 829, 841 (2014) (“As a practical matter, then, it is
the plaintiffs’ attorneys . . . who decide when to initiate [class and derivative] claims, how to
prosecute them, and on what terms to settle them.”); Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The
Plaintiffs’ Attorney’s Role in Class Action and Derivative Litigation: Economic Analysis and
Recommendations for Reform, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 3 (1991) (“[P]laintiffs’ class and derivative
attorneys function essentially as entrepreneurs who bear a substantial amount of the litigation
risk and exercise nearly plenary control over all important decisions in the lawsuit.”).
3.
See, e.g., Coffee, supra note 1, at 218 (“The conventional theory of the private attorney
general stresses that the role of private litigation is not simply to secure compensation for victims,
but is at least equally to generate deterrence, principally by multiplying the total resources
committed to the detection and prosecution of the prohibited behavior.”); Charles R. Korsmo &
Minor Myers, Aggregation by Acquisition: Replacing Class Actions with a Market for Legal Claims,
101 IOWA L. REV. 1323, 1333 (2016) (“By solving the basic collective action problem associated with
mass claims, class and derivative claims preserve the deterrent and compensation goals of our civil
liability system.”).
4.
See 4 WILLIAM B. RUBENSTEIN, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 15:73 (5th ed. 2019) (“[F]ee
awards in class actions average around one-third of the recovery.”); Brian T. Fitzpatrick, An
Empirical Study of Class Action Settlements and Their Fee Awards, 7 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD.
811, 835 tbl.8 (2010) (reporting that the mean and median fee awards were both around 25% over
444 federal class actions suits between 2006 and 2007).
5.
For a thoughtful exploration of the relationship between qui tam actions and class claims,
see Jill E. Fisch, Class Action Reform, Qui Tam, and the Role of the Plaintiff, 60 L. & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 167, 170 (1997).
6.
See id. at 182 (“In the evolving structure of representative litigation, an article exploring
the role of the class action plaintiff would have little utility, except from a historical perspective.”);
Macey & Miller, supra note 2, at 5 (“The named plaintiff does little—indeed, usually does
nothing—to monitor the attorney in order to ensure that representation is competent and zealous,
or to align the interests of the attorney with those of the class or the corporation.”).
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presumed to have little incentive or practical ability to play a significant
role in generating benefits for the class.7 Even where large,
sophisticated lead plaintiffs might exist, such as in stockholder class
actions, the traditional model relegates them to playing the purely
negative role of “monitoring” the plaintiffs’ attorney to prevent abuses.8
For this reason, leading commentators expect very little from lead
plaintiffs.9
In theory, a mechanism exists for giving lead plaintiffs an
incentive to lend their efforts to the class. This is the so-called “plaintiff
incentive award.” But the manner in which courts calculate such
awards makes them woefully inadequate as incentives. Courts, mired
in the traditional concept of the lead plaintiff as a mere figurehead,
typically approach such awards from a restitutional point of view—
attempting to compensate the lead plaintiff for out-of-pocket expenses
associated with their service.10 But mere restitution can, at best, only
remove disincentives. It cannot, by definition, create a positive
incentive. Without the prospect of an actual reward for generating class
benefits, a sophisticated lead plaintiff will typically be better off
pursuing an individual claim.11 The same characteristics that would

7.
See, e.g., James D. Cox, Randall S. Thomas & Dana Kiku, Does the Plaintiff Matter? An
Empirical Analysis of Lead Plaintiffs in Securities Class Actions, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1587, 1593
(2006) (“Class members suffered profound collective action problems that prevented close
monitoring of the class action attorney.”); Macey & Miller, supra note 2, at 5 (“The named plaintiff
does little—indeed, usually does nothing—to monitor the attorney in order to ensure that
representation is competent and zealous, or to align the interests of the attorney with those of the
class or corporation.”); Elliot J. Weiss & John S. Beckerman, Let the Money Do the Monitoring:
How Institutional Investors Can Reduce Agency Costs in Securities Class Actions, 104 YALE L.J.
2053, 2060 (1995) (arguing that lead plaintiffs are often “poorly informed about the theories of
their cases, . . . totally ignorant of the facts, or . . . illiterate concerning financial matters”).
8.
See Weiss & Beckerman, supra note 7, at 2060 (arguing that institutional investors “have
the knowledge and sophistication necessary to serve as effective litigation monitors”). See generally
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 § 101(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77z-1 (2012) (outlining
appointment of lead plaintiffs).
9.
See Fisch, supra note 5, at 173–74:
[A]though the litigation system relies on the client to monitor the lawyer’s conduct in
initiating and conducting litigation, the class plaintiff lacks both the interest and the
ability to monitor. . . . The plaintiff’s expenditure of time in monitoring is costly, and
the expected value of this expenditure is limited substantially by the small size of
plaintiff’s interest. The plaintiff’s interest in monitoring is reduced further by the
virtual elimination of the traditional downside risks associated with unsuccessful
litigation;
Charles Silver & Sam Dinkin, Incentivizing Institutional Investors to Serve as Lead Plaintiffs in
Securities Fraud Class Actions, 57 DEPAUL L. REV. 471, 479 (2008) (summarizing the few
incentives present for class representatives).
10. See infra Section II.C.
11. See infra Section II.B; see also Silver & Dinkin, supra note 9, at 478 (noting that
institutional investors may opt to file individual claims to avoid the higher costs and weaker claims
that accompany class actions).
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make that sophisticated actor valuable to the class—a large stake,
meaningful expertise, and substantial financial resources—also make
it perfectly capable of proceeding individually.12
In this Article, we propose a new model of plaintiff incentive
awards in aggregate claims, one that holds special promise in complex
corporate and securities actions. Our proposal captures the possibility
that the lead plaintiff and the plaintiffs’ attorney can function as an
effective team, with no necessary qualitative difference between their
respective contributions. Because the lead plaintiff can fulfill the same
function as the plaintiffs’ attorney, they ought to be rewarded for doing
so in the same fashion. Instead of calculating a percentage-based award
for the attorneys and then calculating a separate award for the lead
plaintiff, the court should, in appropriate circumstances, calculate a
single award and then allocate it among the “team” in rough proportion
to each member’s respective contribution. Where the plaintiffs’
attorneys and lead plaintiffs have agreed in advance on the allocation,
the court should, in most circumstances, defer to this agreement
between commercially sophisticated parties.
Typical objections to employing plaintiff incentive awards in
such a fashion include that it would lead to excessive or arbitrary
awards, that it would distort the lead plaintiff’s incentives, and that it
would harm the interests of the absent class members. These concerns
ring hollow in this context. If taken seriously, they would, in most cases,
apply even more forcefully against percentage-based contingency fees
for plaintiffs’ attorneys. Moreover, because any reward at all must be
approved by the presiding judge, trial court judges will be well placed
to police potential abuses. Our proposed use of plaintiff incentive
awards would work to the benefit of absent class members by inducing
strong plaintiffs to proceed on a class basis rather than proceeding
individually.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I provides a brief
introduction to plaintiff incentive awards, including their function, how
they have been employed, and concerns about their use based on
traditional conceptions of the role of lead plaintiff. Part II demonstrates
that current approaches to awarding incentive awards, geared toward
the traditional figurehead lead plaintiff, hamper the effectiveness of
such litigation. It also argues that treating the attorneys and lead
plaintiffs as a team for the purpose of incentive awards would be
especially beneficial in complex corporate and securities litigation.
Part III suggests concrete reforms for the use of incentive awards.
Part IV evaluates and rejects potential arguments against more
12. See infra Section II.B.
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aggressive use of plaintiff incentive awards in representative corporate
and securities cases.
I. THE PREVAILING APPROACH TO PLAINTIFF INCENTIVE AWARDS
This Part describes the existing evidence on how courts make
awards to plaintiffs and shows they are common, but small. Courts
regularly gesture toward the importance of providing incentives for
plaintiffs to bring aggregate claims, but at the same time, courts and
lawmakers have expressed thorough skepticism about the practice and
have created a series of limitations on the use of plaintiff awards. The
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (“PSLRA”)13 embraces
this skeptical approach in the extreme, and Delaware’s approach in the
recent Chen v. Howard-Anderson14 case shows that even that state’s
regime holds out little promise to an active lead plaintiff.
A. The Current Pattern of Incentive Awards to Plaintiffs
Plaintiff incentive awards are common, used by many courts to
deliver a special payment to lead or representative plaintiffs in
representative actions—typically class actions or derivative actions.15
At the same time, these awards are very small relative to overall
recoveries and, in real terms, the amounts awarded have declined over
time. Incentive awards are often paid out of the common fund provided
for the recovery of the class.16 Where there is no common fund, courts
may allow defendants to pay a plaintiff incentive award as part of a
settlement under the authority of a fee-shifting statute.17

13. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 § 101a, 15 U.S.C. § 77z-1(a)(4) (2012).
14. No. 5878-VCL, 2017 Del. Ch. LEXIS 734 (Del. Ch. June 30, 2017).
15. These awards are also termed “service awards” or “case contribution awards” by courts.
See 5 RUBENSTEIN, supra note 4, § 17:2.
16. See id. § 17:5 (“Courts have generally approved incentive awards that are withdrawn
from the common fund at the conclusion of the common fund case.”); see also Hadix v. Johnson,
322 F.3d 895, 898 (6th Cir. 2003) (“[I]ncentive awards are usually viewed as extensions of the
common-fund doctrine, a doctrine that holds that a litigant who recovers a common fund for the
benefit of persons other than himself is entitled to recover some of his litigation expenses from the
fund as a whole.”). But cf. Hadix, 322 F.3d at 898 (“Without a common fund, however, there is no
place from which to draw an incentive award. Unsurprisingly, we are unable to find any case where
a claim for an incentive award that is not authorized in a settlement agreement has been granted
in the absence of a common fund.”).
17. 5 RUBENSTEIN, supra note 4, § 17:5 (“If a case does not create a common fund, the
defendant may be required by a fee-shifting statute to pay a prevailing party’s legal fees; if such a
case settles, the defendant will typically agree to pay class counsel’s legal fees as part of the
settlement. In such settlements, a defendant will often agree to pay the class representatives an
incentive award, subject to court approval.”).
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A study by the Federal Judicial Center examined class actions
in four federal district courts in the early 1990s, and it found that 44 of
126 (34.9%) of settled class actions included awards to class
representatives.18 Professor Ted Eisenberg and Professor Geoffrey
Miller’s more comprehensive study of 374 class action opinions from
1993 to 2002 found that 104 cases (27.8%) involved plaintiff incentive
awards.19 They broke cases down by type and found significant
differences: incentive awards were common in consumer credit and
commercial cases (present nearly 60% of the time) and rare in corporate
cases (4.2%).20 Professor William Rubenstein and Rajat Krishna
assembled a database of nearly 1,200 class actions resolved between
2006 and 2011 and found a dramatic increase in the frequency of
plaintiff incentive awards.21 Awards were part of 71.3% of the cases in
his sample, with the rate increasing over time.22 He also found
substantial variance across types of claims—well over 90% of civil
rights and consumer class actions utilized incentive awards, while only
38.7% of securities class actions did so.23
While the incidence of plaintiff incentive awards has increased,
the size of the awards has fallen somewhat in real terms. Eisenberg and
Miller found a median total award of $18,291 and mean of $128,803 in
2002 dollars, and the Rubinstein study found a median of $8,398 and a
mean of $26,326 in 2002 dollars.24 More of the earlier cases involved
more than one named plaintiff receiving an award, so the drop is not as
dramatic on a “per plaintiff” basis. The median “per plaintiff” award
dropped from $4,357 to $4,199, and the mean from $15,992 to $9,355.25
The mean award was highest by far in employment discrimination
cases, perhaps due to the recognition that the plaintiffs faced serious
risks of retaliation.26

18. THOMAS E. WILLGING ET AL., FED. JUDICIAL CTR., EMPIRICAL STUDY OF CLASS ACTIONS IN
FOUR FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS: FINAL REPORT TO THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES
120 fig.16 (1996), https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/rule23_1.pdf [https://perma.cc/
EFT8-S3TM]. A report on the study is published in Thomas E. Willging et al., An Empirical
Analysis of Rule 23 to Address the Rulemaking Challenges, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 74, 101 (1996).
19. See Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, Incentive Awards to Class Action Plaintiffs:
An Empirical Study, 53 UCLA L. REV. 1303, 1320 (2006).
20. Id. at 1323.
21. See William B. Rubenstein & Rajat Krishna, Class Action Incentive Awards: A
Comprehensive Study (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). The study is unpublished,
but summarized in 5 RUBENSTEIN, supra note 4, §§ 17:7–8.
22. See 5 RUBENSTEIN, supra note 4, § 17:7 tbl.1.
23. Id.
24. Id. § 17:8; Eisenberg & Miller, supra note 19, at 1334.
25. 5 RUBENSTEIN, supra note 4, § 17:8.
26. Id.
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Two points on the size of plaintiff incentive awards stand out.
First, the disparity between the medians and means suggests that
award amounts are highly skewed—small awards in most cases, with
substantially larger awards in a handful of cases. This is in keeping
with the typical conception that the lead plaintiff plays a relatively
small role in most representative actions. Second, the amounts awarded
are small, both in absolute and relative terms. Eisenberg and Miller
found that the mean incentive award was only 0.16% of the class
recovery, with the median a minuscule 0.02%.27 This stands in contrast
to attorneys’ fees, where 20% is typical in the corporate context and
perhaps an even higher percentage is typical in other settings. This
surely reflects a judicial perception about the respective contributions
of the lead plaintiff and lead counsel.
B. The Rationale for the Current Pattern of Plaintiff Incentive Awards
The legal basis for a court to make a special award to a lead
plaintiff is decidedly murky. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 makes
no reference to such awards; Professor Rubenstein notes that “[t]he
judiciary has created these awards out of whole cloth”28 and that “few
courts have paused to consider the legal authority for incentive
awards.”29 Instead, courts have generally focused on the rationale for
an incentive award.
The most common rationale grows out of a judicial recognition
that a lead plaintiff is necessary in representative litigation but may be
reluctant to step forward.30 In addition to helping establish the common
factual predicates for recovery by the class, the lead plaintiff can also,
in theory, provide value to the class by monitoring the plaintiffs’
attorney.31 In fulfilling this role, the lead plaintiff bears costs that are
not shared by the rest of the class, including pecuniary outlays and the
opportunity cost of time dedicated to the case.32 At a minimum, lead

27. Eisenberg & Miller, supra note 19, at 1308.
28. 5 RUBENSTEIN, supra note 4, § 17:4.
29. Id. (“There are only a few scattered references in the reported case law to the legal basis
for incentive awards, with no court addressing the question head on.”); see also Greenberg v.
Procter & Gamble Co. (In re Dry Max Pampers Litig.), 724 F.3d 713, 722 (6th Cir. 2013) (“[T]o the
extent that incentive awards are common, they are like dandelions on an unmowed lawn—present
more by inattention than by design.”).
30. See Eisenberg & Miller, supra note 19, at 1305 (“The named plaintiff remains an essential
prerequisite in all class cases.”).
31. See id.
32. See Richard A. Nagareda, Restitution, Rent Extraction, and Class Representatives:
Implications of Incentive Awards, 53 UCLA L. Rev. 1483, 1486, 1488 (2006) (“Discovery aside, the
class representative may incur opportunity costs insofar as she must devote her time to
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plaintiffs are likely to face the costs of responding to discovery requests
and may even be subjected to a deposition.33 They may also suffer
reputational damage, face retaliation from defendants,34 and, in
extreme cases, face sanctions if a case is found to be frivolous.
While all of these costs are borne directly by the lead plaintiff,
the fruits of their efforts are shared pro rata with the entire class.35
Where the lead plaintiff’s share of the recovery is small, the costs of
serving as lead plaintiff can make doing so a negative-value
proposition.36 Even where serving as lead plaintiff is not negative-value
in absolute terms, it will often be so in relative terms—each individual
plaintiff would be better off sitting back and letting someone else bear
the costs of being lead plaintiff. In many cases, this free-rider dynamic
can prevent a suit from being brought in the first place.37
A plaintiff incentive award can serve to counteract this freerider dynamic.38 Courts regularly emphasize the goal of incentivizing a
communication with absent class members concerning the nature, progress, and handling of the
lawsuit.”).
33. See Eisenberg & Miller, supra note 19, at 1305; Nagareda, supra note 32, at 1486
(“Litigating a class action as the class representative means subjecting oneself to discovery in the
manner of a conventional party. By contrast, class action law generally guards against full-fledged
discovery directed toward absent class members.”).
34. This is a particular concern in employment discrimination or whistleblower actions. See
Nagareda, supra note 32, at 1486 (“The clearest illustration comes in the context of employment
discrimination class actions, where the class representative might run the risk of becoming a focal
point for retaliation . . . .”).
35. See Eisenberg & Miller, supra note 19, at 1305 (noting that while “[n]amed plaintiffs incur
costs in performing their role . . . the benefit from the recovery is shared with other class
members”). Eisenberg and Miller further point out that lead plaintiffs may also “gain benefits from
performing their role,” including “psychic benefits such as the pleasure of having their name on
the ‘marquee’ [and] participating in an interesting and stimulating activity.” Id. While such
benefits may be significant in an employment discrimination case or consumer class action, they
are unlikely to be significant in the kinds of corporate and securities actions that are the focus of
this Article.
36. Id. at 1305–06 (“In some cases—consumer class actions, where the typical class-member
recovery is low, being an example—a class member may even experience a net loss from acting as
class champion because the small recoveries normally gained from the case are not enough to cover
the increased costs . . . .”).
37. Id. at 1306 (“At the limit, free-rider effects can result in litigation failing because no one
is willing to act as class champion.”).
38. PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIGATION § 1.05 cmt. h (AM. LAW INST. 2019):
Judges have encouraged lead parties to invest more heavily in litigation by reimbursing
them for expenses incurred and time expended at reasonable hourly rates. This practice
has a simple economic justification. Part of the justification is comparable to the
practice, common in many states, of providing incentive bonuses for named plaintiffs
and other class members whose participation contributes importantly to a successful
result, and who must on occasion bear additional responsibilities and face the
possibility of the adverse demands and consequences of being a named party to
litigation;
see Eisenberg & Miller, supra note 19, at 1307 (“In the absence of an effective mechanism for
compensating class representatives through class counsel . . . the interests of the class and the
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lead plaintiff to step forward,39 often breaking the justification down
into several parts: (1) compensation for expense and work undertaken
for the class; (2) compensation for financial and other risks attendant
to serving as lead plaintiff; and (3) rewarding the lead plaintiff for
serving as a “private attorney general” for the benefit of the class and,
perhaps, society.40
C. Skepticism About the Use of Incentive Awards
Despite the proliferation of plaintiff incentive awards in recent
decades, courts and legislatures continue to express policy concerns
about their use. These can be roughly grouped under four headings,
though they overlap somewhat. The first and most obvious objection to
plaintiff incentive awards is that they drive a wedge between the
incentives of the named plaintiff and those of the absent class
members—the named plaintiff receives the award, and the absent class
members do not.41 The lead plaintiff may be tempted to enter into a
collusive settlement, trading off value for the class in exchange for a
larger incentive award.42 Where the incentive award is large compared
purposes of class action litigation can be served by allowing the court the discretion to pay class
representatives.”).
39. See, e.g., Cook v. Niedert, 142 F.3d 1004, 1016 (7th Cir. 1998) (“Because a named plaintiff
is an essential ingredient of any class action, an incentive award is appropriate if it is necessary
to induce an individual to participate in the suit.”).
40. See Rodriguez v. W. Publ’g Corp., 563 F.3d 948, 958–59 (9th Cir. 2009) (stating that
plaintiff incentive awards “are intended to compensate class representatives for work done on
behalf of the class, to make up for financial or reputational risk undertaken in bringing the action,
and, sometimes, to recognize their willingness to act as a private attorney general.”); 5
RUBENSTEIN, supra note 4, § 17:4.
41. The ALI Principles caution that any plaintiff award “should not be an incentive for
securing the acquiescence of either the lead parties or the named class members on a basis adverse
to the interests of the aggregated group as a whole.” PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE
LITIGATION § 1.05 cmt. h (AM. LAW INST. 2019); see also 5 RUBENSTEIN, supra note 4, § 17:3 (“[T]he
central cost of incentive awards is the risk that the class representative’s interests will diverge
from or conflict with those of the class . . . .”).
42. See, e.g., Greenberg v. Procter & Gamble Co. (In re Dry Max Pampers Litig.), 724 F.3d
713, 722 (6th Cir. 2013) (“[W]e should be most dubious of incentive payments when they make the
class representatives whole, or (as here) even more than whole; for in that case the class
representatives have no reason to care whether the mechanisms available to unnamed class
members can provide adequate relief.”); Weseley v. Spear, Leeds & Kellogg, 711 F. Supp. 713, 720
(E.D.N.Y. 1989) (“If class representatives expect routinely to receive special awards in addition to
their share of the recovery, they may be tempted to accept suboptimal settlements at the expense
of the class members whose interests they are appointed to guard.”); Raider v. Sunderland, No.
Civ.A. 19357 NC, 2006 WL 75310, at *1 (Del. Ch. Jan. 5, 2006) (expressing concern over a lead
plaintiff’s incentives where a “bonus” award is available); 5 RUBENSTEIN, supra note 4, § 17:1
(“[W]ith the promise of a significant award upon settlement of a class suit, the representative
might prioritize securing that payment over serving the class.”); Id. § 17:3 (“Courts fear that a
class representative can be induced by a special payment to sell out the class’s interests.”);
Eisenberg & Miller, supra note 19, at 1312 (“Some courts and commentators have criticized
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to the lead plaintiff’s share of the actual recovery, some courts have
expressed concerns that the award may render the lead plaintiff no
longer “similarly situated” to other class members, calling into question
its adequacy as a class representative.43
A second criticism of plaintiff incentive awards is that the lead
plaintiff often does little of value for the class, and the diversion of a
portion of the recovery is inappropriate and unfair.44 Congress has been
especially scornful of “[p]rofessional plaintiffs who own a nominal
number of shares in a wide array of public companies,” deriding the fact
that “in many cases the ‘lead plaintiff’ has not even read the
complaint.”45 The findings prefacing the Class Action Fairness Act of
2005 characterize as an “abuse” cases where “unjustified awards are
made to certain plaintiffs at the expense of other class members.”46
A third concern is that lead plaintiffs will engage in rent-seeking
behavior. This can take at least two forms. First, courts and
commentators have expressed concern that the availability of incentive
awards will give potential lead plaintiffs leverage to threaten a class
action in order to instead secure a larger settlement in an individual
suit.47 Second, where the lead plaintiff is in a position to choose which
plaintiffs’ lawyer will have control of the litigation—together with the
attendant financial rewards—the plaintiff may use this power to
extract rents.48 This carries both the risk of the rent extraction itself,
and the possibility that a lead plaintiff will select counsel based on
which plaintiff’s lawyer is likely to work to secure a large incentive
award rather than which will best represent the class. This is
particularly a concern in securities class actions, where the PSLRA
incentive awards on the ground that they undermine the named plaintiff’s incentives to monitor
suboptimal or collusive settlements.”).
43. See, e.g., Radcliffe v. Experian Info. Sols. Inc., 715 F.3d 1157, 1164 (9th Cir. 2013)
(expressing concern that plaintiff incentive awards may “destroy the adequacy of the class
representatives”); Chavez v. Lumber Liquidators, Inc., No. CV–09–4812 SC, 2015 WL 2174168, at
*3 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (“Among other things, the concern about incentive awards and the class
representative’s adequacy is that, when presented with a potential settlement, the class
representative may be more concerned with maximizing those incentives than with judging the
adequacy of the settlement as it applies to class members at large.”).
44. See Eisenberg & Miller, supra note 19, at 1312 (“Others have expressed concern about
the fairness of the named plaintiff receiving a larger award than the rest of the class.”).
45. H.R. REP. NO. 104-369, at 32–33 (1995) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730,
732–33.
46. See Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, § 2(a)(3)(B), 119 Stat. 4, 4.
47. See Eisenberg & Miller, supra note 19, at 1312 (“Incentive awards have also been seen as
providing inappropriate leverage to plaintiffs to threaten class action litigation in order to obtain
a larger settlement in their individual lawsuits.”).
48. See Nagareda, supra note 32, at 1494 (“When the law itself puts into place a
gatekeeper . . . between class counsel and the considerable financial returns that flow from control
of class action litigation, there is a real possibility that the gatekeeper will catch on to what is
happening. The gatekeeper soon may become a toll taker.”).
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presumptively vests control of the litigation in particular
shareholders.49
Lastly, many courts and commentators express a vague
discomfort with the idea of persons actually profiting from litigation,
rather than simply being compensated for harm suffered. This sense
that litigation for profit is somehow unwholesome is generally inchoate,
but quite evidently widely held and deeply felt. The unease frequently
surfaces in the form of expressions of concern that plaintiff incentive
awards will create “professional plaintiffs”—with little or no
examination of why professional plaintiffs are ipso facto undesirable—
or in conclusory statements about the undesirability of plaintiffs
motivated by a “bounty.”50 As Professors Eisenberg and Miller note,
“Incentive awards have been stigmatized as a means for paying off
‘professional plaintiffs.’ ”51 In many ways, hostility toward professional
plaintiffs mirrors the antipathy often directed toward so-called
appraisal arbitrageurs and patent trolls.52 In part, this hostility
appears rooted in the idea that “professional” plaintiffs must be

49. See id. (“Because control of a given litigation presumptively rests with shareholders who
have the ‘largest financial interest in the relief sought by the class,’ the game for plaintiffs’ lawyers
now consists of establishing relationships with the sorts of large institutional investors likely to
meet the PSLRA criterion.”).
50. See, e.g., Sauby v. City of Fargo, No. 3:07-cv-10, 2009 WL 2168942, at *2 (D.N.D. July 16,
2009) (“Requests for incentive awards should be carefully scrutinized to ensure the named
plaintiffs did not bring suit expecting a bounty . . . .”); H.R. REP. NO. 104-369, at 32–33 (expressing
concern that “professional plaintiffs . . . often receive compensation in the form of bounty
payments”); id. at 33 (“Individuals who are motivated by the payment of a bounty or bonus should
not be permitted to serve as lead plaintiffs.”); 5 RUBENSTEIN, supra note 4, § 17:16 (“[P]aying the
class representatives a portion of the settlement fund is simply unseemly: it gives the appearance
that the representative is either a professional plaintiff, or a bounty hunter, not a servant for the
class.” (footnotes omitted)).
51. Eisenberg & Miller, supra note 19, at 1312–13; see also In re UnumProvident Corp.
Derivative Litig., Lead Case No. 1:02-cv-386, 2010 WL 289179, at *8 (E.D. Tenn. Jan. 20, 2010)
(expressing concern that “paying plaintiffs [out of attorneys’ fees] could lead to professional
plaintiffs”); H.R. REP. NO. 104-369, at 33 (“Individuals who are motivated by the payment of a
bounty or bonus should not be permitted to serve as lead plaintiffs.”); 5 RUBENSTEIN, supra note
4, § 17:5 (stating that payments to lead plaintiffs out of attorneys’ fees “would also create bad
policy,” without any further elaboration).
52. See, e.g., Charles Korsmo & Minor Myers, Reforming Modern Appraisal Litigation, 41
DEL. J. CORP. L. 279, 314 (“One basic supposition that undergirds criticism of appraisal is that
there is something improper or unseemly about buying a lawsuit in this way.”); James F.
McDonough III, The Myth of the Patent Troll: An Alternative View of the Function of Patent Dealers
in an Idea Economy, 56 EMORY L. J. 189, 196–97 (2006) (discussing accusations that “patent trolls”
manipulate the system and engage in “legalized extortion” (quoting Bernard Stamler, Battle of the
Patents,
Like
David
v.
Goliath,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Feb.
21,
2006),
https://www.nytimes.com/2006/02/21/business/businessspecial2/battles-of-the-patents-like-davidv-goliath.html [https://perma.cc/4YYN-NUCX])).
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engaged in rent-seeking behavior, either on behalf of plaintiffs’
attorneys53 or on behalf of themselves.54
D. Limitations on the Use of Incentive Awards
These concerns have manifested themselves in a number of
limitations on the use of plaintiff incentive awards. In the first place,
when a case settles—as the vast majority of class actions that survive
a motion to dismiss do55—plaintiff incentive awards included as part of
a settlement agreement are subject to judicial scrutiny, which is
occasionally quite vigorous.56 In Delaware, this scrutiny has taken on
the shape of a general presumption against awarding plaintiff incentive
awards.57
In addition to this general scrutiny, several award-related
practices are strongly disfavored and rarely approved. One such
disfavored practice is a settlement that calls for an award to those
named plaintiffs who agree to support the settlement but no award for
those who oppose it.58 The manifest problem with this kind of

53. See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 104-369, at 32–33 (“Professional plaintiffs who own a nominal
number of shares in a wide array of public companies permit lawyers readily to file abusive
securities class action lawsuits. . . . These lead plaintiffs often receive compensation in the form of
bounty payments or bonuses.”).
54. As Professor Nagareda noted, the lead plaintiff, as gatekeeper to control of a
representative action, “may become a toll taker.” Nagareda, supra note 32, at 1494. As he went on
to note, criticisms of this dynamic “carry an air of unreality. Like Captain Louis Renault in the
classic film Casablanca, we are ‘shocked, shocked,’ to find that there may be rent extraction going
on here!” Id. at 1495.
55. See 5 RUBENSTEIN, supra note 4, § 17:4 (noting that “most class suits settle [and] the
parties typically agree to pay the class representatives some incentive award”).
56. See, e.g., Radcliffe v. Experian Info. Sols., 715 F.3d 1157, 1164 (9th Cir. 2013) (noting that
trial courts “must be vigilant in scrutinizing all incentive awards”); Sauby v. City of Fargo, No.
3:07-cv-10, 2009 WL 2168942, at *2 (D.N.D. July 16, 2009) (“Requests for incentive awards should
be carefully scrutinized to ensure the named plaintiffs did not bring suit expecting a bounty or
otherwise compromised the interest of the class for personal gain.” (citing Hadix v. Johnson, 322
F.3d 895, 897 (6th Cir. 2003))); Plummer v. Chem. Bank, 91 F.R.D. 434, 442 (S.D.N.Y. 1981)
(writing that the presence of a plaintiff incentive award “must be regarded as prima facie evidence
that the settlement is unfair to the class, and a heavy burden falls on those who seek approval of
such a settlement” (citation omitted)); 5 RUBENSTEIN, supra note 4, § 17:14 (noting that “courts
have been somewhat careful in policing certain incentive award practices”).
57. See Chen v. Howard-Anderson, No. 5878-VCL, 2017 Del. Ch. LEXIS 734, at *10 (Del. Ch.
June 30, 2017) (“Under Delaware law, there is an expectation that the compensation for creating
a common fund goes to counsel, and hence a ‘presumption against awarding a separate payment
or bonus’ to a named plaintiff.” (quoting Raider v. Sunderland, No. Civ.A 19357 NC, 2006 Del. Ch.
LEXIS, at *8 (Del. Ch. Jan. 4, 2006))).
58. See Radcliffe, 715 F.3d at 1166 (referencing Professor Rubenstein’s testimony that his
research found “not one” judicially approved settlement agreement containing a conditional
plaintiff incentive award); 5 RUBENSTEIN, supra note 4, § 17:15 (noting that “[a]t least two
circuits—the Seventh and Ninth—have [categorically] prohibited such” conditional plaintiff
incentive awards).

Korsmo Myers_PAGE

1936

11/18/2019 6:47 AM

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 72:6:1923

conditional award is that it can be used to coerce named plaintiffs into
accepting an otherwise deficient settlement, in direct conflict with such
plaintiffs’ monitoring role.59
A second disfavored practice is an “ex ante agreement between
putative class counsel and putative class representatives containing
certain assurances with regard to incentive awards.”60 The leading case
involved an agreement by counsel to seek an award that would increase
on a sliding scale with the amount of the monetary recovery.61 The court
identified a number of concerns with enforcing such agreements,
including that (1) it could lead to “excessive” awards, divorced from the
actual costs and risks incurred by named plaintiffs;62 (2) it could distort
named plaintiffs’ incentives, causing them to favor monetary recovery
over injunctive relief that might be more advantageous to the class;63
and (3) it would be an unseemly end run around rules against sharing
attorneys’ fees with clients.64
A third disfavored practice is seeking a percentage of the group
recovery as a plaintiff incentive award. While courts may cross-check a
proposed award by examining the percentage of the recovery it would
represent, “there are very, very few cases in which class counsel have
sought, and courts have approved, incentive awards that are actually
measured as a percentage of the common fund recovery.”65 The
objections to percentage-based awards are similar to those canvassed

59. See 5 RUBENSTEIN, supra note 4, § 17:15 (“A structural provision in a settlement
agreement that has the effect of squelching class representatives’ ability to adequately represent
the class by voicing their concerns is, simply, not in the class’s best interests.”).
60. Id. § 17:17; see also Chen, 2017 Del. Ch. LEXIS 734, at *21 (“This court has held that an
ex ante agreement in which counsel agrees to pay an incentive award to a representative plaintiff
violates public policy.” (citing In re Fuqua Indus., Inc. S’holder Litig., No. Civ.A 11974, 2006 WL
2640967 (Del. Ch. Sept. 7, 2006)).
61. Rodriguez v. W. Publ’g Corp., 563 F.3d 948, 957 (9th Cir. 2009).
62. See id. at 959 (“[T]hey obligate class counsel to request an arbitrary award not reflective
of the amount of work done, or the risks undertaken, or the time spent on the litigation . . . .”).
63. See id.:
The court found it particularly problematic that the incentive agreements correlated
the incentive request solely to the settlement or litigated recovery, as the effect was to
make the contracting class representatives’ interests actually different from the class’s
interests in settling a case instead of trying it to verdict, seeking injunctive relief, and
insisting on compensation greater than $10 million.
64. See id. (“[T]hey create at least the appearance of impropriety; they violate the California
Rules of Professional Conduct prohibiting fee-sharing with clients and among lawyers; and they
encourage figurehead cases and bounty payments by potential class counsel.”).
65. 5 RUBENSTEIN, supra note 4, § 17:16. Rubenstein goes on to conclude that “[p]ercentagebased incentive awards are disfavored, if not altogether forbidden.” Id.
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above: (1) they could be excessive,66 (2) they could skew the plaintiffs’
incentives,67 and (3) they feel icky.68
E. The PSLRA
The PSLRA was especially attentive to the role of the lead
plaintiff but at the same time imposed strictures on what lead plaintiffs
could receive.69 On the one hand, the PSLRA embraced the idea that
the lead plaintiff should monitor the lead counsel, creating a statutory
presumption that the investor with the largest stake should be
appointed lead plaintiff.70 The aspiration in particular was that a large
stakeholder would constrain the lawyers acting on behalf of the class.71
However, the PSLRA envisions nothing more than a monitoring
role for the lead plaintiff. The statute limits lead plaintiff awards to
“reasonable costs and expenses (including lost wages) directly relating
to the representation of the class.”72 Thus, it is not surprising that
empirical work has found that lead plaintiffs are least likely to receive
remuneration in securities class actions.73 In this way, the PSLRA
rejects any notion that awards to lead plaintiffs should serve as any
kind of reward for their efforts. The PSLRA may empower particular
class members to monitor the lawyers serving as lead counsel, but in its
embrace of a purely restitutional approach, where the lead plaintiff can

66. See id. (“[P]aying the class representatives a portion of the settlement amount untethers
the award from the services that the representatives provided to the class and the risks they took
in doing so. . . . [It also] threaten[s] to be excessive.”).
67. Id. (“[S]uch awards may skew the class representatives’ incentives by encouraging them
to hold out for greater recovery . . . [and] privilege monetary recoveries over other remedies, such
as injunctive relief . . . .”).
68. See id. (“[P]aying the class representatives a portion of the settlement fund is simply
unseemly: it gives the appearance that the representative is either a professional plaintiff, or a
bounty hunter, not a servant for the class.”).
69. See Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77-78 (2012).
70. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(iii)(bb) (2012).
71. Representative litigation spawns a serious and well-known agency problem between the
class members who technically “own” the claims and the class attorneys who, in practice, typically
control the litigation. See Eisenberg & Miller, supra note 19, at 1304 (“As has long been recognized,
these cases tend to be dominated by entrepreneurial attorneys who effectively control all phases
of the litigation.”); see, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding the Plaintiff’s Attorney: The
Implications of Economic Theory for Private Enforcement of Law Through Class and Derivative
Actions, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 669 (1986); Korsmo & Myers, supra note 3, 1325; Macey & Miller, supra
note 2. A plaintiffs’ attorney pursuing a contingency fee will often have a more concentrated
economic stake than any individual plaintiff and may also have incentives that diverge from those
of the plaintiffs. See Korsmo & Myers, supra note 3, at 1326.
72. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(4).
73. See discussion supra notes 21–23 and accompanying text.
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be made whole but can receive no more,74 the statute limits any
incentive for a class member to bring the claim in the first place.
F. Delaware and the Example of Chen v. Howard-Anderson
Given its importance in corporate and commercial disputes,
Delaware looms especially large, and its approach to plaintiff incentive
awards deserves special attention. The Court of Chancery may give an
award to the lead plaintiff where the plaintiff has (1) dedicated
substantial time and effort to the case,75 (2) provided meaningful
expertise on behalf of the class,76 (3) generated benefit for the class,77
and (4) faced risks in serving as lead plaintiff.78 But even in Delaware,
a jurisdiction unmatched in its sophistication and attentiveness to the
realities of litigation, the regime holds out minimal incentives to a
sophisticated lead plaintiff. A recent case—Chen v. HowardAnderson79—illustrates the point.
At first glance, Chen is a strange choice for demonstrating the
shortcomings of the prevailing practice on plaintiff incentive awards,
given that it involved the largest award ever granted by the Delaware
Court of Chancery.80 Yet it nevertheless shows the inadequacy of
current incentive awards when it comes to motivating sophisticated
would-be lead plaintiffs in any real way. It also demonstrates the gross
disparity in the treatment of awards to attorneys and to lead plaintiffs.
74. See H.R. REP. NO. 104-369, at 33 (1995) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730,
733 (“Lead plaintiffs are not entitled to a bounty for their services.”); Nagareda, supra note 32, at
1489 (concluding that the PSLRA’s “language embrace[s] restitution but reject[s] reward beyond
the class representative’s ‘pro rata share of any recovery’ ” (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 78u4(a)(2)(A)(vii))).
75. See, e.g., Chen v. Howard-Anderson, No. 5878-VCL, 2017 Del. Ch. LEXIS 734, at *7–8
(Del. Ch. June 30, 2017); Brinckerhoff v. Tex. E. Prods. Pipeline Co., 986 A.2d 370, 396 (Del. Ch.
2010); Raider v. Sunderland, No. Civ.A. 19357 NC, 2006 WL 75310, at *2 (Del. Ch. Jan. 4, 2006).
76. See, e.g., Chen, 2017 Del. Ch. LEXIS 734, at *11; Raider, 2006 WL 75310, at *2.
77. See Chen, 2017 Del. Ch. LEXIS 734, at *11; Raider, 2006 WL 75310, at *2.
78. See Chen, 2017 Del. Ch. LEXIS 734, at *17; Fox v. CDx Holdings, Inc., No. 8031-VCL,
2015 WL 5163790, at *1 (Del. Ch. Sept. 2, 2015). These factors overlap substantially with the
inquiries in determining plaintiffs’ attorneys’ fees. Ams. Mining Corp. v. Theriault, 51 A.3d 1213,
1254 (Del. 2012) (noting that a trial court making an award to plaintiffs’ attorneys out of a common
fund must consider “1) the results achieved; 2) the time and effort of counsel; 3) the relative
complexities of the litigation; 4) any contingency factor; and 5) the standing and ability of counsel
involved” (quoting Sugarland Indus., Inc. v. Thomas, 420 A.2d 142, 149 (Del. 1980))). The major
difference is that for attorneys’ fees, the “result achieved” is explicitly considered and, where a
percentage award is granted, is paramount. See id. at 1255 (“But the most important factor, the
cases suggest, is the benefit.” (quoting the chancery court’s hearing approving the attorneys’ fee
award)). For a lead plaintiff, the result is only formally relevant to the extent the plaintiff can
show they “generated” it.
79. 2017 Del. Ch. LEXIS 734.
80. See id. at *20 (“[T]his appears to be the largest incentive award that this court has ever
approved.”).
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The case arose out of a 2011 merger transaction between Occam
Networks, Inc. and Calix, Inc.81 Plaintiffs holding approximately 19%
of Occam’s stock filed suit, alleging various breaches of duty by Occam’s
officers and directors, as well as disclosure deficiencies.82 Serving as
lead counsel for the plaintiffs were the Delaware firm of Smith,
Katzenstein & Jenkins LLP and Levi & Korsinsky, LLP, a New York
firm.83 The court appointed two experienced investors and substantial
stockholders, Herbert Chen and Derek Sheeler, as class
representatives.84
One defendant settled on the eve of trial, and the remaining
defendants followed suit after three days of trial.85 The total settlement
amount was $35 million in cash.86 The plaintiffs’ firms involved in the
case financed the litigation by working on contingency, with Levi &
Korsinsky paying the lion’s share of the out-of-pocket expenses—
$1.7 million out of a total of approximately $2 million—and the bulk of
the expenses (approximately $1.4 million) going toward paying expert
witnesses.87
Herbert Chen, one of the lead plaintiffs, was the driving force
behind the litigation and played a vital role in seeing it to a successful
conclusion. As Vice Chancellor Laster concluded after trial, “Chen’s
involvement was critical.”88 Levi & Korsinsky had assigned a “more
junior” attorney to work on the case.89 And as the court pointed out,
“[T]he vast majority of Levi & Korsinsky’s litigation efforts involve[d]
early disclosure-only or therapeutic settlements,”90 and the firm “had
never before taken a case to trial or even deep into the litigation
process.”91 Additionally, the $1.7 million that the firm ultimately
invested in the case was “an amount far greater than what Levi &
Korsinsky had [ever before] invested in its M&A litigation efforts.”92
The court concluded that without Chen—and his constant threat to

81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.

See Chen v. Howard-Anderson, 87 A.3d 648, 653 (Del. Ch. 2014).
Id. at 664.
Id. at 652.
Id. at 664.
See Chen, 2017 Del. Ch. LEXIS 734, at *4.
Id. at *1.
Id. at *4, *22.
Id. at *16.
See id. at *12, *22.
Id. at *22.
Id.
Id.
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attempt to replace class counsel—the case may never have progressed
past a quick, low-value settlement.93
Chen—an experienced investor and research analyst—
personally worked more than four thousand hours on the litigation.94
He wrote memoranda and personally reviewed discovery materials.95
He prepared drafts of litigation documents;96 “generated some of the
litigation team’s key legal strategies”;97 “brought to bear” his
“significant expertise in negotiations” during settlement talks;98 and
“brought valuation expertise to the litigation team,” which he used to
select and critique the expert witnesses.99 Lead Delaware counsel
recognized that “Chen had provided invaluable services to the class and
had been at least ten times more valuable than any other named
plaintiff” he had ever known.100
Chen also faced risks by serving as class representative. He was
deposed and subjected to discovery.101 The defendants used this
discovery to accuse Chen of trading on confidential information.102
While Chen was cleared of wrongdoing by both the court and the
Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”), he was forced to bear
substantial expense in defending against the charges.103 The
accusations also ensnared another investor whom Chen had regarded
“as his mentor,” and they also led to articles in the media that
“destroyed [Chen’s] reputation and effectively prevented him from
finding a job on Wall Street.”104
Chen requested an award of $4,863,880—accompanied by
“meticulous evidentiary support to document his involvement.”105 Lead
Delaware counsel, while acknowledging Chen’s “invaluable services to

93. Id. at *15 (“Without Chen’s commitment to the case, there was a substantial risk that the
attorneys would not have pressed forward during the initial post-closing phase . . . .”); id. at *16
(“But for Chen, my sense is that Levi would have limited” resources dedicated to the case); id. at
*22 (noting that “[w]hen the defendants came forward with a [low-value] settlement, the three
Levi & Korsinsky attorneys jumped at it. Joseph Levi saw a chance to cover his costs, avoid the
risk of a loss, and secure a fee”).
94. Id. at *12–14.
95. Id. at *13.
96. Id. at *15.
97. Id. at *14.
98. Id. at *13.
99. Id. at *16.
100. Id. at *12.
101. Id. at *17.
102. See id. at *18.
103. Id. at *19–20 (noting that “Chen had to hire counsel, produce extensive discovery . . . and
sit for a ten-hour deposition” in the SEC investigation).
104. Id. at *19.
105. Id. at *11–12.
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the class,” recommended he receive only $1 million.106 The court
ultimately adopted Delaware counsel’s recommendation and awarded
Chen $1 million.107 The court acknowledged that “[i]f anything, the
award is low given Chen’s contributions,”108 but it nonetheless felt
constrained by Delaware law’s general presumption against incentive
awards, together with the lack of precedent for a larger award.109
Class counsel, by contrast, applied for and was awarded 30% of
the recovery, or $8.65 million.110 In a case where the lead plaintiff’s
efforts were extraordinary and arguably as or even more valuable to the
class, the disparity in sheer size between the amount awarded to the
attorneys and the amount awarded to the lead counsel is remarkable.
Lead counsel took home more than eight times what the court was able
to award to the lead plaintiff.
The level of scrutiny applied to the plaintiff award likewise
stands in sharp contrast to the relatively routine approval of 30% for
the lead counsel.111 The examination of the lead plaintiff’s application
spanned nearly seven pages of analysis and included a detailed and
exhaustive summary of Chen’s role. By contrast, the court needed only
a single paragraph to approve lead counsel’s fee request, noting that the
litigation was complex, risky, and required significant investment, with
no attempt at quantification.112
Delaware continues to express skepticism about incentive
awards to plaintiffs. In the 2018 Saba Software case, the Court of
Chancery approved a $100,000 incentive award to a plaintiff who had
prepared a five-hundred-page SEC whistleblower complaint that was,
according to the attorneys, “the blueprint for our understanding of the
accounting issues that were at play here.”113 Later in 2018, however,
the Delaware Supreme Court observed that “incentive fee awards may
be problematic” and “encourage[d] a careful review of the factors to be

106. Id. at *12.
107. Id. at *20.
108. Id.
109. Id. at *10, *20 (“Chen has advanced sound arguments as to why the award could be much
higher. An award of $1 million, however, is already unprecedented.”).
110. Id. at *8–9, *23. The award represented a baseline of $9,906,318.89, minus the $1.25
million awarded to the lead plaintiffs. Id. at *23. In addition to Chen’s $1 million, the other lead
plaintiff, Sheeler, was awarded $250,000. Id. at *20. The split between Levi & Korsinsky and lead
Delaware counsel, Smith, Katzenstein & Jenkins, was not disclosed.
111. Though, after subtracting the share awarded to the class representatives, the percentage
kept by counsel is closer to 26%.
112. Chen, 2017 Del. Ch. LEXIS 734, at *22.
113. See Jeff Montgomery, Chancery OKs $19.5M Deal Ending Saba Software Merger Suit,
LAW360
(Sept.
24,
2018,
8:15
PM),
https://www.law360.com/articles/1085786
[https://perma.cc/29B9-N3V5].
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considered before making incentive fee awards.”114 In light of that
guidance, the Court of Chancery noted in early 2019 that “this has
become an issue that we are increasingly being asked to scrutinize.”115
In a derivative suit involving Zynga, the parties reached a settlement
that recovered $11.25 million.116 The court awarded the plaintiff
attorneys’ fees and expenses of $2.25 million, and the lead plaintiff had
requested an incentive award of $5,000.117 The court noted that it was
“sympathetic that he put in, although he doesn’t have an exact
quantification of it, a meaningful amount of time in the case,” but was
ultimately “uncomfortable awarding” him $5,000.118 Instead, it
awarded him $2,000.119
II. GETTING THE INCENTIVES RIGHT FOR POTENTIAL LEAD PLAINTIFFS
The basic policy objective of lead plaintiff awards is to induce
plaintiffs to bring claims in a representative capacity instead of
bringing them solely on their own behalf. The problem is that the
restitutionary approach taken by most courts makes serving as lead
plaintiff unappealing, and that is especially so when the potential lead
plaintiff is a financial institution. This Part outlines the policy
challenge and explains why the prevailing practice of awards to lead
plaintiffs is inadequate.
A. The Limited Appeal of a Representative Claim
Many potential plaintiffs are likely to approach litigation as an
investment, evaluating at each step the course of action offering the
most attractive mix of risk and reward. This will surely be so for
potential plaintiffs in corporate and securities claims. The decision to
put time and money into litigation will be weighed like any other
investment—in terms of its expected return. This approach has two
major consequences. First, many potential plaintiffs generally cannot
be expected to serve as active lead plaintiffs for nonfinancial reasons.
Second, in order for serving as an active lead plaintiff to be worth their
while, investors (especially institutional investors) would need to
114. Isaacson v. Niedermayer, 200 A.3d 1205, 1205 n.1 (Del. 2018).
115. Transcript of Continued Hearing on the Special Litigation, Committee’s Motion for
Approval of the Proposed Settlement, Plaintiff’s Application for Award of Attorneys’ Fees,
Expenses, and an Incentive Award, and Rulings of the Court at 61, Sandys v. Pincus, No. 9512CB (Del. Ch. Jan. 18, 2019).
116. Id. at 6, 36 (calling the $11.25 million the “settlement fund”).
117. Id. at 56, 60.
118. Id. at 61.
119. Id.
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receive an adequate return on their investment in the litigation, over
and above merely recovering their costs.
In many class action contexts, lead plaintiffs may be motivated
to take an active role by nonpecuniary considerations. Most obviously,
plaintiffs in civil rights or employment discrimination actions may be
strongly motivated by a desire to pursue justice. This may even be a
motivation in consumer class actions or mass torts. As Eisenberg and
Miller point out, “Named plaintiffs also gain benefits from performing
their role.”120 Among these are “psychic benefits such as the pleasure of
having their name on the ‘marquee,’ being catered to by counsel, or
participating in an interesting and stimulating activity.”121 These
benefits will likely ring hollow to an institutional stockholder, who is
likely to be focused exclusively on financial considerations. Indeed, even
if the managers of such an institution were personally inclined to serve
as lead plaintiffs, they may be compelled by fiduciary obligations to
their investors to focus exclusively on financial considerations.
The focus on financial considerations means that litigation in
general—and serving as lead plaintiff in particular—must offer an
adequate return on investment in order to be worthwhile. Unless lead
plaintiffs are permitted to earn an adequate return on their costs—
above and beyond mere restitution—the litigation-related costs portion
of the institutional investor’s investment must be regarded as having
zero return, thus lowering the overall return from litigation.122 As a
result, positive-value claims would not be brought,123 resulting in
underdeterrence and undercompensation.

120. Eisenberg & Miller, supra note 19, at 1305.
121. Id.
122. Consider, for example, an institutional investor with a $100 million investment in a
company’s stock, and whose investment targets require an expected return of 15% in order to
pursue an investment. Imagine the investor has a claim that could be expected to return $15
million. If it were cost-free, the claim would meet the investor’s investment criteria and be worth
litigation ($15m/$100m = 15%). But suppose that it would cost $10 million (in time, money, and
opportunity costs) to litigate the claim. The overall investment in the litigation would now be $110
million. Even if the plaintiff could recover these additional costs via a plaintiff incentive award,
the investment would no longer meet the required return threshold, and would not be brought
($15m/$110m = 13.6%).
123. See Silver & Dinkin, supra note 9, at 472 (“The PSLRA thus makes it economically
irrational for class members to volunteer as lead plaintiffs, absent special motivations. Because
private institutional investors care only about their bottom lines, they prefer to sit on the
sidelines.”).
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B. The Appeal of Proceeding Individually
When a potential plaintiff considers pressing a claim, that
plaintiff will often be better off proceeding on an individual basis.124
This is especially so in strong corporate and securities cases.125 Where
a plaintiff has a large enough stake—either held as an ordinary
investment or acquired after the fact by a specialist fund with the
intention of pursuing litigation—a suit will have positive value even on
an individual basis, thus negating the need for a representative action
in the first place, at least from the plaintiff’s perspective.126 In such
cases, the institutional plaintiff would have little or nothing to gain
from pursuing aggregate relief. Doing so would cause the plaintiff to
lose control of the litigation and also lose control over the terms of the
settlement. While a class claim might spread the costs of litigation
across a wider group, those costs could be substantially higher, as the
institutional investor would lose the ability to negotiate fees directly
with the attorneys.127 The institutional investor may be better off
paying all of the fees directly, on a negotiated hourly basis, rather than
paying only a share of a contingency fee as part of a class.
By proceeding individually, an institutional investor can also
preserve the potential for bringing a class action as a threat against the
defendant in order to extract a larger settlement individually.
Defendants might be eager to pay off this threat, in the hopes that in
the absence of the strong institutional plaintiff, a class action will either
not be brought at all or will be litigated half-heartedly to a cheap
settlement.
While proceeding individually may be optimal for a strong
plaintiff, it is suboptimal from a public policy perspective, leading to
underdeterrence, undercompensation, and wealth transfers from small
124. Cox, Thomas & Kiku, supra note 7, at 1604 (“Institutional investors with large potential
claims have sometimes found it more advantageous to act for themselves rather than on behalf of
all other investors.”); Silver & Dinkin, supra note 9, at 478:
Individual lawsuits are cheaper than class actions, which entail expensive procedures
like . . . judicial approval of settlements and fees. Class actions can also water down
institutional investors’ claims by mixing them with individual investors’ weaker claims.
For this reason, large investors sometimes opt out of class actions and sue on their own.
125. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Litigation Governance: Taking Accountability Seriously, 110
COLUM. L. REV. 288, 309–14 (2010).
126. See id. at 312, 314 (noting that institutional investors in the AOL Time Warner
settlement who opted-out “did significantly better than if they had stayed in the class” and
suggesting that the “securities class action could become the vehicle of last resort for only those
smaller claimants who cannot economically afford to opt out”).
127. See PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIGATION § 1.05 cmt. h (AM. LAW INST.
2019) (noting that “[w]ithout these payments, potential lead plaintiffs often find it economically
advantageous . . . to file conventional lawsuits of benefit to themselves alone”).
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to large investors. Indeed, where large investors opt out, there are even
fewer potentially effective monitors of class counsel among those
remaining in the class.128 Consider, for example, an institutional
stockholder bringing—and settling for cash—a meritorious case while
holding 20% of the stock of the issuer. In such a case, the defendants
will bear only a fraction of the cost of their wrongdoing, leading to
underdeterrence. Moreover, the absent 80% of stockholders will receive
no compensation. Where the institutional plaintiff is able to use the
threat of a class action to extract a larger settlement, the problem of
underdeterrence is somewhat reduced, but it is accompanied by a
transfer of wealth from the absent stockholders to the institutional
stockholder.
Both deterrence and compensation goals—as well as equality of
treatment—would be furthered by the institutional plaintiff forgoing
individual litigation in favor of spearheading a representative action.
The availability of an adequate incentive award is likely to be crucial in
convincing a sophisticated potential lead plaintiff to do so.
C. Restitution Is Not an Incentive
Courts and lawmakers have been right to note that an award to
a lead plaintiff must provide compensation, at a minimum, for costs
incurred. But awards that do nothing more, awards that are purely
restitutionary in nature, cannot provide an incentive to serve as lead
plaintiff.129 At best, such an award can leave a potential lead plaintiff
indifferent to serving or not serving.130 To actually encourage a lead
plaintiff to step forward, and to encourage the lead plaintiff to make the
right level of investment in the job on behalf of the class, an incentive
award must also provide a reward—above and beyond compensation—
for good service.131

128. See Keith N. Hylton, Deterrence and Aggregate Litigation 21 (Bos. Univ. Sch. of Law,
Working Paper No. 17-45, 2017), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3059583
[https://perma.cc/3QME-P5NA] (“The negative claim class left behind by opt-out litigants is
vulnerable to the monitoring problem: no victim has an incentive to serve as a genuine monitor so
the lawyer is likely to enter into a collusive settlement.”).
129. Cox, Thomas & Kiku, supra note 7, at 1602 (“Having an independent, engaged plaintiff
is socially useful. Despite these benefits, few financial institutions seek to so involve themselves,
presumably because they do not see that the rewards of doing so are sufficient to offset the cost of
becoming involved.”).
130. Silver & Dinkin, supra note 9, at 481 (“Getting institutions to step from the sidelines onto
the playing field requires larger bonuses than individual investors historically received.”).
131. Eisenberg & Miller, supra note 19, at 1306 (emphasizing “the potential social value of
compensating named plaintiffs for the full costs of their contributions to the litigation, and also
rewarding them for good performance”); Nagareda, supra note 32, at 1488:
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Although courts have paid lip-service to the desirability of
plaintiff incentive awards serving as a reward, the actual pattern of
such awards has been largely restitutional in nature.132 Awards
reimburse the lead plaintiff’s reasonable costs but hold out no
meaningful reward for good performance. This means that the vast bulk
of incentive awards are small in absolute terms, and miniscule as a
percentage of the recovery.133 The related worry is over “excessive”
incentive awards—that an award above the direct costs faced by the
lead plaintiff may unacceptably skew the plaintiff’s incentives.134 The
only examples of significant awards for risk are in the employment
discrimination context, where the risks are retaliation or loss of
reputation.135 Financial risks are generally ignored—financial
expenditures are compensated, but not rewarded with a risk-related
return on capital.
Delaware is highly attentive to the incentive effects its rulings
have on the behavior of plaintiffs’ attorneys, but, as the Chen case
illustrates, the doctrine in Delaware fails to consider the incentives that
bear on potential lead plaintiffs. The award to class counsel in that case
was in addition to the nearly $2 million in out-of-pocket expenses for
which they had already been reimbursed out of the class recovery.136 By
contrast, Chen’s award was an all-in figure that appears unlikely even
to reimburse him for the opportunity costs of his time, let alone the
reputational and career damage he suffered as a result of being the
public face of the litigation. It is highly unlikely that any potential lead
plaintiff would observe Chen’s experience and feel an urge to replicate
it.

An “incentive” for someone to do something for the benefit of others encompasses both
the prospect of recompense for effort expended (restitution) and the prospect of benefit
beyond what that person might gain simply by sitting back and remaining within the
undifferentiated group (reward). . . . Ideally, incentive awards should reward highquality monitoring but not low-quality monitoring.
132. See Silver & Dinkin, supra note 9, at 481:
Dollar-for-dollar reimbursement provides no incentive to bear these costs [of serving as
lead plaintiff]. This is especially true in light of the risk of losing the opportunity cost
of diverting employees from more profitable business activities to monitoring litigation,
‘the potential for disclosure of proprietary nonpublic information,’ the danger of losing
access to inside information going forward, and the possibility of being sued by
disgruntled plaintiffs.
(quoting Cox, Thomas & Kiku, supra note 7, at 1602).
133. See supra Part I.
134. See supra Part I.
135. See supra Part I.
136. See supra Section I.F.
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D. The Backwards Policy Behind the PSLRA
The PSLRA likewise adopts a wholly restitutional approach that
offers no real incentive to lead plaintiffs. In the first place, a would-be
institutional lead plaintiff may fear that the focus on costs “directly
relating to the representation” may mean that its less-tangible costs,
such as opportunity costs, will not be compensated.137 But even if all
costs are fully compensated, that would merely mean that the lead
plaintiff received a 0% return on its investment in serving as lead
plaintiff—not exactly an attractive prospect to an institutional investor.
It is hardly surprising that, as many scholars have pointed out, the
PSLRA has had disappointing results in terms of attracting
institutional lead plaintiffs.138 Indeed, more than a decade ago,
Professor Nagareda identified the restitutional approach of the PSLRA
as working “at cross-purposes with the ideal of high-quality monitoring
by class representatives,”139 highlighting the incongruity of the limits
on incentive awards “when the law consciously seeks to induce highquality monitoring from persons who devote their professional lives to
seeking big financial rewards, not just restitution for the costs and
expenses of their efforts.”140
E. Artificial Constraints on Financing the Prosecution of
Aggregate Claims
Were a lead plaintiff to supply financing under current rules,
however, it would put an amount at risk that could easily run into the
millions of dollars, constituting a significant drag on returns if that risk
is uncompensated, as well as a major downside risk if the litigation is
unsuccessful. Even a sophisticated and well-capitalized lead plaintiff
would be reluctant to finance litigation in a securities case because the
PSLRA prohibits any financial return on expenditures. This is an
especially sharp deterrent against an institutional stockholder opting
137. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(4); Nagareda, supra note 32, at 1489–90 (“Burdens on
institutional investors include the prospect of disruptive discovery into their internal business
practices and trading activities.”).
138. See Stephen J. Choi et al., Do Institutions Matter? The Impact of the Lead Plaintiff
Provision of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, 83 WASH. U. L.Q. 869, 877 (2005)
(concluding that institutional investor involvement remained “quite small” following passage of
the PSLRA); Cox, Thomas & Kiku, supra note 7, at 1590–91 (discussing the findings of their study,
which demonstrates that institutions post-PSLRA are reluctant to act as lead plaintiffs).
139. Nagareda, supra note 32, at 1489, 1491 (“When it comes to service as a PSLRA lead
plaintiff, one substantial sticking point for many institutional investors appears to be precisely the
prospect of merely gaining restitution for their efforts, without the possibility of reward beyond
their pro rata share of any class-wide recovery.”).
140. Id. at 1491.
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to finance the litigation itself, rather than have the plaintiffs’ lawyers
finance it by working on contingency.
Most representative litigation is financed by the plaintiffs’
attorneys, who then hope to recoup their investment through a
contingency award at the conclusion of the case. This may sometimes
be necessary because no individual plaintiff has the financial resources
or the incentive to finance a case that proceeds all the way through trial.
Furthermore, collective action problems prevent plaintiffs from pooling
their resources even where paying by the hour would be preferable.
Lawyer-provided financing, however, comes with significant downsides.
First, it means “that plaintiffs’ attorneys are generally providing a
bundled set of undifferentiated services, including legal services and
financing of the litigation itself.”141 As a result, it is extremely difficult
for plaintiffs to determine how much they are paying for financing, let
alone engage in any real price shopping—indeed, plaintiffs’ attorneys
rarely compete on price at all, and instead “compete largely on
quality.”142 Second, there is little reason to think that plaintiffs’ firms
are the lowest-cost providers of financing. By their nature, law firms
lack the capital resources of large financial institutions, and they also
face difficulty achieving adequate diversification due to the human
capital constraints on the number of cases they can take on at any one
time.143
The result is that lawyer-provided financing does not come
cheap. Plaintiffs’ attorneys are routinely awarded between one-fifth and
one-third of any recovery in representative litigation.144 In successful
cases, such an award can vastly exceed the amount the attorneys would
have earned had they been paid by the hour. Courts justify such awards
as necessary for rewarding the attorneys for financing the litigation—
working on contingency and running the risk of getting nothing if the
litigation was unsuccessful. While this practice is sensible, the reward
often goes far beyond what a financial investor would demand for
bearing a similar risk.
141. Korsmo & Myers, supra note 3, at 1345.
142. Id. at 1344; see also Lester Brickman, The Market for Contingent Fee-Financed Tort
Litigation: Is It Price Competitive?, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 65, 93–97 (2003) (answering the title
question: no).
143. See Peter Charles Choharis, A Comprehensive Market Strategy for Tort Reform, 12 YALE
J. ON REG. 435, 476 (1995) (noting that “in order to invest [labor] in many lawsuits, plaintiffs’ law
firms would have to be huge”); Korsmo & Myers, supra note 3, at 1345 (stating that law firms “are
limited in the number of cases they can effectively take on at any given time”); Richard W. Painter,
Litigating on a Contingency: A Monopoly on Champions or a Market for Champerty?, 71 CHI.-KENT.
L. REV. 625, 678–80 (1995) (noting the difficulties faced by law firms in achieving adequate
diversification).
144. See, e.g., Fitzpatrick, supra note 4, at 833 (noting that fee awards range from 3% of the
settlement to 47%, with a mean award of 25.4% and a median of 25%).
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For reasons that are never clearly stated, however, it appears
that courts are only willing to compensate the lawyers for bearing this
financial risk. Other parties who finance litigation are not awarded
multiples of their expenses to compensate them for the risk they bear.
Courts have indicated an unwillingness to award contingency fees to
plaintiffs’ attorneys who have already been paid by the hour, as they
might if they’d obtained funds provided by litigation financiers.145 This
refusal is based on the fact that the attorneys have already been paid a
negotiated rate and have not borne the kind of risk that usually justifies
such awards. At the same time, however, no court seems inclined to
award any reward beyond mere reimbursement to the parties that paid
the attorneys, despite the fact that these parties have borne precisely
the kind of risk usually used to justify a contingency fee that exceeds a
typical hourly rate.146
The practice of rewarding law firms that finance litigation—
while refusing to similarly reward other parties who finance litigation—
creates a strong bias in favor of law firms financing litigation, even
where other parties may be able to do so at lower cost. In most class
action contexts, this bias is unlikely to do much harm because the law
firm really is likely to be the most plausible source of financing.147 In
the corporate and securities context, however, an institutional
stockholder plaintiff may be much better suited to bear the financial
burden, yet still be frozen out.
In stockholder litigation, large institutional investors are likely
to have sufficient financial resources to serve as an alternative source
of financing, paying plaintiffs’ attorneys by the hour where doing so
would be preferable. Due in part to the fact that these institutional
investors have far greater capital resources at their disposal than even
the largest law firms, such investors will frequently be much better
placed to offer financing at substantially lower cost. Moreover,
specialist litigation funds would be able to lower their risk (and thus

145. See, e.g., Sciabacucchi v. Salzberg, No. CV 2017-0931-JTL, 2019 WL 2913272, at *7 (Del.
Ch. July 8, 2019) (EP) (“Some degree of contingency risk is a prerequisite for a risk-based award:
If counsel were paid by the hour, then they can at most receive reimbursement of their fees and
expenses.”).
146. The PSLRA of course forbids doing so. See supra notes 75–76.
147. With the increasing prevalence of litigation finance firms—who seek to profit by financing
litigation—this may not always be the case. See Korsmo & Myers, supra note 3, at 1346–52
(describing the operation of such firms). See generally Austin T. Popp, Note, Federal Regulation of
Third-Party Litigation Finance, 72 VAND. L. REV. 727, 731–40 (2019) (providing an overview of
historical and modern forms of third-party litigation finance),
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costs) by investing in multiple cases, achieving diversification on a
greater scale than is practicable for a law firm.148
F. Prior Proposals to Empower Lead Plaintiffs
This inadequacy of existing incentives to serve as lead plaintiff
has led other commentators to propose a variety of reforms to aggregate
litigation. Professors Cox and Thomas, for example, have argued that
courts should be more willing to compensate lead plaintiffs “for all
expenses related to an institution’s participation as a lead plaintiff.”149
This enhanced form of restitution would cover not only direct costs but
also the costs of time devoted by internal investment and professional
staff to monitoring the case.150 They also suggested that a lead plaintiff
might receive an award exceeding the costs, similar to an attorney’s
lodestar award, which would encourage service as a lead plaintiff.151
Others have offered proposals designed to import market
dynamics through an auction process. Professors Macey and Miller, for
example, proposed that the named plaintiff simply be eliminated in
large claims and also that claims be auctioned in judicial sale.152
Professor Silver and economist Sam Dinkin offered three related but
alternative reform proposals. First, they proposed that a lead plaintiff
could receive a multiple of its holdings, increasing its economic
exposure to the claims and thus the appeal of the role.153 Second, a court
could sell off a standardized share of the gross class recovery to the
highest bidder. The auction winner would serve as lead plaintiff, and
the proceeds of the auction sale would be distributed among class
members along with any other recoveries.154 Their third proposal was
their preferred one: conducting an auction for 30% of any funds
recovered, but requiring the winner to bear all costs and expenses
associated with prosecuting the suit.155

148. See Korsmo & Myers, supra note 3, at 1345 (“Dedicated purchasers of legal claims would
be able to employ greater capital resources and engage in more thorough diversification than is
generally possible for law firms.”). Financial engineering could generate even greater
diversification. See, e.g., Michael Abramowicz, On the Alienability of Legal Claims, 114 YALE L.J.
697, 739–40 (2005) (“A corporation could easily be established to prosecute a single large claim,
and its shares could even be publicly traded, to further facilitate diversification of risk.”).
149. Cox, Thomas & Kiku, supra note 7, at 1637 (emphasis added).
150. Id.
151. Id. at 1637–38.
152. Macey & Miller, supra note 2, at 6.
153. Silver & Dinkin, supra note 9, at 489–91.
154. Id. at 492–500.
155. Id. at 500–05.
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These types of proposals have many advantages over the
prevailing regime, including better incentives to serve as lead plaintiff
and to monitor the cost and performance of class counsel.156 But as
others have observed, the auction regime falls short in a critical way: it
can “undercut the incentive to commit resources investigating possible
corporate wrongdoing” in the first place.157 A creative plaintiff might
commit considerable resources to investigate a potential claim and even
acquire assignments only to have the aggregate litigation rights
purchased away entirely (as under Macey and Miller’s proposal) or
diluted (as under Silver and Dinkin’s proposal).158 This reduces the
incentive to invest in developing claims, especially for complex and
obscure types of claims.
The approach we develop here builds on the suggestion of Cox
and Thomas by decoupling the award a lead plaintiff can expect from
both the damages it suffered as a class member and its out-of-pocket
costs.159 We go further, however, in suggesting that the lead plaintiff
might be put on equal footing with class counsel in fee awards. Our
proposal also is similar in concept to the third proposal of Silver and
Dinkin160 in that our proposal would potentially give the lead plaintiff
and class counsel a similar share of the gross recovery, to be divided as
they see fit. But our proposal would require that the lead plaintiff earn
that share through service to the class by identifying and prosecuting
the claim, not simply by paying for it at the commencement of the suit.
Our proposal thus preserves the incentive for potential lead plaintiffs
to invest in claim development. This approach may not be superior in
all cases, but where investigating and pursuing the claim requires some
initial risk, it may prove superior.
In general, our proposed solution can be distinguished from
these important earlier contributions in three ways. First, unlike
auction proposals, which would create a new and potentially
complicated procedure, our proposal works within the existing
framework of attorney and plaintiff incentive awards. Second, as noted
above, our proposal would not undercut the incentive to develop claims
by allowing them to be scooped up by an outsider in an auction. Third,
earlier proposals involve decisions being made at an early stage of the
proceedings, when uncertainty is typically high. In contrast, our
proposal features a judicial decision made with the benefit of hindsight
156. See Fisch, supra note 5, at 176–83 (discussing the benefits and drawbacks of various
proposals).
157. Id. at 182.
158. Macey & Miller, supra note 2; Silver & Dinkin, supra note 9.
159. Cox, Thomas & Kiku, supra note 7.
160. Silver & Dinkin, supra note 9.
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at the end of the proceeding, either after trial or when approving a
settlement.
Postponing the decision on the plaintiff’s reward has two
benefits. First, once a plaintiff secures control of a claim via an auction,
she may be tempted to use that control to favor her own interests at the
expense of the class. This temptation would be lessened under our
proposal. The plaintiff’s award would be determined with the benefit of
hindsight, with the court unlikely to reward self-serving behavior.
Second, auction-style proposals would require the would-be lead
plaintiff to make the crucial investment decision at the outset, when
information about the value of the claim may not be fully developed. At
best, bidders will have to discount what they are willing to pay to
account for this uncertainty and lack of information, reducing the
amount of proceeds going to the class. At worst, the need for an upfront
decision will prevent bidders from emerging at all.161 Our proposal
would allow lead plaintiffs to “stage” their investments, a crucial
method for dealing with risk and lack of information when investing in
hard-to-value assets.162 Lead plaintiffs would be able to recalibrate
their investment as new information emerged—deciding at key stages
of the litigation what resources to dedicate to motion practice,
discovery, trial preparation, and so on—just as plaintiffs’ attorneys do.
III. A BETTER APPROACH TO PLAINTIFF INCENTIVE AWARDS
Current legal doctrine reflects a strongly ingrained notion that
the plaintiffs’ attorney is the only relevant player in representative
litigation, while the lead plaintiff is at best secondary, and more often
wholly inconsequential. In many contexts, no doubt, this notion is
largely accurate. But in other contexts, particularly in corporate and
securities claims, this is not so. An active lead plaintiff can be as
important, or even more important, than the plaintiffs’ attorney in
obtaining benefits for the class. The lead plaintiff and counsel could
function more as a team than they would in the typical conception of a
class action, which has a leader (the lawyer) and a monitor (the lead
plaintiff). Where this is the case, courts should approach calculating an

161. See Korsmo & Myers, supra note 3, at 1369 (“An auction . . . unavoidably entails a onetime valuation at a relatively early stage, with all the attendant risk of getting it wrong. To the
extent that claims are difficult to value and the risk of error is high, the resulting market is likely
to be thin.”).
162. See generally id. (“If during the course of litigation the acquirer finds the claims to be
more valuable than originally estimated, it may purchase additional claims to supplement the
original position.”).
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appropriate plaintiff incentive award in much the same way as
calculating an appropriate attorneys’ fee.
Indeed, in cases driven by lead plaintiffs, the judicial task should
reduce to apportioning what would normally be the attorneys’ fee award
between the lawyers and the lead plaintiffs, based on their respective
contributions. In doing so, the court will essentially be policing a team
production problem, where the efforts of multiple parties are required
to produce an undifferentiated group benefit—here, the common
fund.163 The judicial task, then, has two steps. First, determining an
appropriate overall award, in much the same way as is currently done
in determining an appropriate plaintiffs’ attorney fee. And then second,
deciding how to apportion that award among the attorneys and the lead
plaintiffs. We present the details of our proposal in this Part.
A. Incentive Awards Should Reward Expertise and Financial Risk
Traditional formulations for evaluating plaintiff incentive
awards consider, in theory, the expertise brought to bear by the lead
plaintiff,164 together with the risks the plaintiff has borne.165 These
considerations mirror those used in calculating the award to be granted
to plaintiffs’ attorneys out of a common fund. In practice, however, lead
plaintiffs are not rewarded for their expertise in identifying and
pressing claims to anything like the extent plaintiffs’ attorneys are
rewarded.
In appropriate cases, plaintiffs’ attorneys are rewarded richly
indeed. Just in the corporate and securities context, Delaware courts,
for example, have not hesitated to award very large attorneys’ fees
where the litigation resulted in real monetary recovery and this result
could be attributed to the efforts and expertise of counsel.166 In one
163. See, e.g., Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate
Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 247, 249 (1999) (“In the economic literature, team production problems are
said to arise in situations where a productive activity requires the combined investment and
coordinated effort of two or more individuals or groups.”). See generally Armen A. Alchian & Harold
Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 777,
779–81 (1972) (describing the team production problem); Bengt Holmstrom, Moral Hazard in
Teams, 13 BELL J. ECON. 324, 326–30 (1982) (discussing the role of group incentives during the
team production process).
164. See, e.g., Raider v. Sunderland, No. Civ.A. 19357 NC, 2006 WL 75310, at *2 (Del. Ch. Jan.
5, 2006) (using three factors to provide a “bonus payment” to the lead plaintiffs, one of which was
that the “time and expertise provided by Raider were well beyond that provided by a typical
plaintiff”).
165. See Fox v. CDX Holdings, Inc., No. 8031-VCL, 2015 WL 4571398, at *26 (Del. Ch. July
28, 2015) (finding a breach of duty because the board members knew of the risk in placing a value
on the company which did not comport with their subjective belief); 5 RUBENSTEIN, supra note 4,
§ 17:3 & nn.15–17 (collecting cases).
166. See, e.g., Ams. Mining Corp. v. Theriault, 51 A.3d 1213, 1257–59 (Del. 2012).
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extreme instance, the Delaware Court of Chancery awarded plaintiffs’
counsel $304 million in fees—15% of the recovery—where it was
convinced the benefit was due to the efforts of counsel, where the case
was complex, and where the attorneys had taken the risk of litigating
on contingency, spending $1 million on out-of-pocket costs in the
process.167 The award came to approximately $35,000 per hour
worked.168 Then-Chancellor Strine defended such awards as “creat[ing]
a healthy incentive for plaintiff’s lawyers to actually seek real
achievement for the companies that they represent in derivative actions
and the classes that they represent in class actions.”169 In short, such
awards are essential in attracting the efforts of would-be private
attorneys general in the first place.
The lack of similar awards to lead plaintiffs is no doubt due, at
least in part, to the scarcity of cases where the lead plaintiff plays a
meaningful role. But even in a case like Chen, where the lead plaintiff’s
valuable contribution of expertise and effort has indisputably been vital
in securing a significant benefit for the class, the calculation of Chen’s
reward looks nothing like the calculation of the reward for the
attorney.170 Even more problematically, while courts recognize the risk
of litigating on contingency and experiencing out-of-pocket costs as
justification for awards that are multiples of those costs and risks, lead
plaintiffs are granted only restitution for their financial costs.171
In such cases, courts should recognize that the lead plaintiff and
the plaintiffs’ attorneys are functioning as a team in producing the class
benefits. Courts should acknowledge situations where lead plaintiffs
are fulfilling at least some of the functions traditionally performed by
plaintiffs’ attorneys, and then reward them accordingly. Lead plaintiffs
who provide meaningful expertise and undertake meaningful financial
risk—by, for example, paying class counsel by the hour—should be
rewarded for doing so in the same fashion as plaintiffs’ attorneys would.
Failing to treat them similarly results in inadequate incentives for
institutional investors to serve as private attorneys general in corporate
and securities cases where plaintiffs’ law firms are ill-equipped to do so,
resulting in a suboptimal team.

167.
168.
169.
170.
171.

Id. at 1218, 1255–56.
Id. at 1252.
Id. (quoting the chancery court’s decision).
See discussion supra notes 81–109 and accompanying text.
See supra Section II.D.

Korsmo Myers_PAGE

2019]

11/18/2019 6:47 AM

LEAD PLAINTIFF INCENTIVES

1955

B. Percentage-Based Awards Should Be Favored
The first step of the two-stage analysis we envision—
determining an appropriate overall fee for the team responsible for the
class benefit—need not change. In a typical class action, where the class
benefits are entirely attributable to the efforts of the plaintiffs’
attorneys, or nearly so, fee awards in cases resulting in a quantifiable
benefit typically take the form of a percentage of the benefit.172 As the
Delaware Supreme Court has suggested, a percentage fee recognizes
that the most important consideration should be the overall benefit to
the class.173 At times, percentage fees have been criticized as providing
windfalls disproportionate to the efforts actually made by the plaintiffs’
attorneys.174 This led to a movement in the 1970s and 1980s away from
percentage-based awards and toward first calculating a reasonable
hourly fee—the so-called “lodestar”—and then applying a “multiplier”
based on the risk involved and the quality of the attorneys’ work.175
By the mid-1980s, however, many observers had become
disenchanted with the lodestar method.176 In 1985, a task force of the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit issued an influential report
criticizing the lodestar method and recommending a return to
percentage-based fees in common fund cases.177 In making this
recommendation, the task force identified a number of deficiencies with
the lodestar method, including its false sense of precision and
determinacy, the incentive it creates to prolong the number of hours
worked, and the burden it places on judges.178 Perhaps the most salient
advantage of a percentage-based fee, however, is that it rewards

172. See, e.g., Ams. Mining Corp., 51 A.3d at 1253 (“Beginning in 1881, [plaintiffs’ attorneys]
fees were calculated and awarded from a common fund based on a percentage of that fund.”); id.
at 1259 (“When the benefit is quantifiable . . . Sugarland calls for an award of attorneys’ fees based
upon a percentage of the benefit.”).
173. See id. (“In determining the amount of a reasonable fee award, our holding in Sugarland
assigns the greatest weight to the benefit achieved in the litigation.”).
174. See Report of the Third Circuit Task Force, Court Awarded Attorney Fees, 108 F.R.D.
237, 242 (3d. Cir. 1986) (“However, the percentage-of-recovery system sometimes resulted in
strikingly large fee awards in a number of cases. Press reaction to these awards, and criticism
from within the profession that the fees were disproportionate to the actual efforts expended by
the attorneys, generated pressure to shift away from the percentage-of-recovery approach.”).
175. See Id. at 243 (describing the factors considered when calculating the “lodestar” and the
factors for determining the “multiplier”); Lindy Bros. Builders v. Am. Radiator & Standard
Sanitary Corp., 487 F.2d 161, 167–69 (3d Cir. 1973) (outlining the determination of a reasonable
hourly rate and the other considerations for determining reasonable compensation).
176. See Report of the Third Circuit Task Force, 108 F.R.D. at 246 (noting that the lodestar
approach “has come under increased criticism, with some observers asserting that its technique
causes more problems than it solves”).
177. Id. at 246–49, 260–65.
178. Id. at 246–49.
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attorneys in direct proportion to the consideration that matters most—
the recovery for the class.179 In essence, percentage-based awards make
the recipient an equity holder in the claims, giving them an incentive
to maximize the value of that equity.
Where a lead plaintiff is nothing more than a necessary
figurehead, the type of compensation provided by the lodestar method—
and by traditional approaches to incentive awards—is all that is
necessary, perhaps with a small “kicker” reward to overcome any
collective action problems that would prevent anyone from being willing
to serve. Where, however, the lead plaintiff is a sophisticated party,
vital to the initiation and success of the litigation, the situation
changes. From the perspective of the absent class members who benefit
from their efforts, the lead plaintiff’s role becomes indistinguishable
from that of the attorneys, with the two functioning as a team. The
same considerations that make a percentage-based fee superior for
attorneys also apply for a sophisticated lead plaintiff. Courts have
decades of experience selecting appropriate percentage-based fees to
reward attorneys for securing class benefits. If, however, institutional
investors are able, by diversification or otherwise, to reduce the risks
they face as compared to law firms, we expect that somewhat lower
percentage awards would be sufficient.180
The basic approach to calculating an appropriate percentage
need not change as applied to active lead plaintiffs. All that must
change is the strong presumption that allowing the lead plaintiff to
share in a percentage fee is improper.
C. Ex Ante Fee Agreements Should Be Favored
Where a sophisticated lead plaintiff and the plaintiffs’ lawyers
operate as a team, the second step of the process we envision—
allocating the fee award among the attorneys and lead plaintiffs—is
potentially more difficult. The key feature of the team production
problem is the difficulty of figuring out how to allocate the benefits
generated by team production.181 Even if a court wanted to split a
179. See, e.g., Ams. Mining Corp. v. Theriault, 51 A.3d 1213, 1254 (Del. 2012) (noting that
Delaware rejects the lodestar method of “award[ing] fees based on hourly rates that may not be
commensurate with the value of the common fund created by the attorneys’ efforts”).
180. See infra Section III.F.
181. See Blair & Stout, supra note 163, at 249:
If the team members’ investments are firm-specific . . . and if output from the enterprise
is nonseparable (meaning that it is difficult to attribute any particular portion of the
joint output to any particular member’s contribution), serious problems can arise in
determining how any economic surpluses generated by team production—any ‘rents’—
should be divided.
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percentage-based fee among the lead plaintiffs and plaintiffs’ attorneys,
it may be difficult for that court to determine, after the fact, the relative
contributions of the various parties.
This problem is hardly unique to the lead plaintiff context. The
problem arises on a routine basis any time two or more law firms team
up to litigate a case together. The typical judicial approach in such cases
is to avoid the question altogether, leaving it to the firms themselves to
work out. Often firms will decide how any incentive fee will be divided
upfront, and only when the firms are entirely at loggerheads will the
court step in to muddle through the allocation as best it can.
The same considerations favor an ex ante agreement in the
context of corporate and securities litigation with an institutional
investor lead plaintiff. In many cases, the allocation would likely be
simple. Institutional lead plaintiffs, with their greater financial
resources and monitoring capability, would simply pay by the hour—
just like most defendants—and the parties would agree that the lead
plaintiffs would receive the entire incentive award. In other cases, the
interested parties might decide on a different division of risk and
reward. The more vital the plaintiffs’ attorneys to the prospective
success of the case, the more lead plaintiffs will be willing to give up,
and vice versa. In most cases, the resulting split—the product of
bargaining by sophisticated parties in a competitive market—will be a
better measure of the parties’ relative contribution than anything a
court could craft after the fact.182
While not directly analogous, a fee dispute in the recent case In
re Appraisal of Dell, Inc. is instructive.183 The case involved multiple
appraisal petitioners, the largest group of which entered into a
contingency fee agreement with lead counsel. The agreement provided
that counsel would “advance[ ] the expenses necessary to litigate the
case . . . and receive an attorneys’ fee equal to the amount [of the
benefit] with the percentage depending on the magnitude of the
recovery and how far the litigation progressed.”184 Following a
successful trial, several of the other petitioners who had not signed the
fee agreement objected to being required to pay the same fees. The court
182. The ALI Principles endorse this general idea, though not exactly in this context. See
PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIGATION § 1.05 cmt. h (AM. LAW INST. 2019) (suggesting
that judges “should attempt to employ the same fee and cost arrangements represented persons
would use if they could hire lawyers directly”).
183. See In re Appraisal of Dell, Inc., No. 9322-VCL, 2016 WL 6069017, at *1–6 (Del. Ch. Oct.
17, 2016) (providing factual background on the case, which concerned the payment of contingency
fees when multiple appraisal petitioners, some of which did not sign the fee agreement at issue,
are involved), rev’d sub nom. Dell, Inc. v. Magnetar Global Event Driven Master Fund Ltd, 177
A.3d 1 (Del. 2016).
184. Id. at *1.
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ultimately imposed the same fee on all petitioners—not because they
were bound by the fee arrangement, but because “an arm’s-length
agreement, particularly with a sophisticated client, as in this instance,
can provide an initial ‘rough cut’ of a commercially reasonable fee.”185
Ultimately, the trial result was overturned on appeal, including the
allocation of fees, which the Delaware Supreme Court ordered adjusted
to reflect the unique benefits obtained by the lead plaintiff.186 The case
for deference to an ex ante agreement, however, is stronger here, where
the agreement is not as to the total amount of the award—which is still
to be determined by the court—but simply governs the allocation of the
award, a matter as to which the absent members of the class are likely
to be indifferent.
As a result, ex ante agreements as to how the ultimate incentive
award will be divided ought to be welcomed by courts, rather than
invalidated or ignored.
D. Embracing Specialist Litigation Investors as Lead Plaintiffs
Dedicated investment funds that specialize in litigation can
potentially make extremely effective lead plaintiffs, promising greater
expertise and lower cost than one-time players.187 As noted earlier,
concerns regarding anything beyond purely restitutionary plaintiff
incentive awards are often outgrowths of opposition to “professional
plaintiffs” seeking a “bounty.”188 We have argued elsewhere that this
revulsion toward litigation for profit is seldom well founded.189 Others

185. Id. at *14, 19 (quoting Wis. Inv. Bd. v. Bartlett, No. Civ.A. 17727, 2002 WL 568417, at *6
(Del. Ch. Apr. 9, 2002)).
186. See Dell, Inc., 177 A.3d at 46:
We fail to see how the Court of Chancery could refuse to reduce the amount of expenses
owed by . . . other stockholders entitled to appraisal to account in some balanced and
fair way for the benefits that Lead Counsel obtained through its representation of [the
lead plaintiff] and that [the lead plaintiff] obtained thanks to the fair value award and
settlement leverage it gained by delaying resolution of its entitlement to appraisal until
after trial.
Ultimately, the Delaware Supreme Court concluded that, on remand, the Court of Chancery “must
make a reasoned and sizable reduction in those [expenses] awarded against the shares entitled to
appraisal to account for the fair share [the lead plaintiff] should have borne, but the Lead Counsel
chose not to seek from it.” Id.
187. See Korsmo & Myers, supra note 3, at 1343 (“Financiers can pay attorneys by the hour
and have the kind of concentrated economic stake and repeat player expertise that will give them
the incentive and wherewithal to effectively monitor the course of the litigation.”).
188. See discussion supra note 53–54 and accompanying text.
189. See Korsmo & Myers, supra note 3, at 1372–80 (arguing that the traditional concerns that
such litigation might inappropriately commodify personhood, encourage predatory behavior, lead
to meritless litigation, inadequately deter offenders, or simply prove impractical, are largely
unfounded); Korsmo & Myers, supra note 52, at 315 (“Unless the appraisal right itself is
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have likewise recognized the potential benefits of a cadre of specialist
lead plaintiffs.190 For example, consider the hedge funds who purchased
distressed mortgage-backed securities in the wake of the financial
crisis. Many of these funds intended to enforce legal rights against the
sellers who made false representations about the quality of the loans
included in the securities. Although sometimes termed “vulture
funds,”191 these entities sought out situations where the sellers had thus
far gotten away with fraud totaling in the tens of billions of dollars due
to the lack of an adequate plaintiff. In seeking to remedy this
wrongdoing, the after-acquiring funds were benefiting other holders of
the securities. Perhaps more importantly, they were also furthering the
public policy goal of deterring fraud.192 Viewed in this light, they might
be characterized as “white knight” funds, rather than “vulture funds.”
They were motivated by a desire to benefit themselves, to be sure, but
we should expect no more of lead plaintiffs than we do of butchers,
brewers, or bakers.193
In any event, the revulsion against “speculating in litigation” is
of ancient vintage194 and is still widely felt by people with Stone Age
moral sensibilities. It forms at least some of the basis for restrictions on
champerty.195 It also serves as a prominent aspect of opposition to
substantively undesirable, the mere fact that it has been transferred to someone better able to
vindicate the right does not constitute an argument against its vindication.”).
190. See Cox, Thomas & Kiku, supra note 7, at 1638:
[A] demonstrated record as a diligent monitor of the present suit, when coupled with a
good track record of being such a monitor in other cases, should be more than enough
to persuade the court that the petitioning institution has only the positive
characteristics associated with being a professional plaintiff;
Silver & Dinkin, supra note 9, at 495 (raising the possibility that “litigation specialists” might
emerge to buy into class action claims).
191. See, e.g., Brief for Amicus Curiae the Securities Industry & Financial Markets Ass’n in
Support of Defendant-Appellant at 12, ACE Sec. Corp. v. DB Structured Prods., Inc., 977 N.Y.S.2d
229 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2013) (discussing “[t]he financial crisis and the vulture-fund [residential
mortgage backed security] wave”).
192. See James D. Cox, Response, Securities Class Actions as Public Law, 160 U. PA. L. REV.
PENNUMBRA 73, 74 (2011) (“The securities laws carry out several public objectives in addition to
protecting the individual investor.”).
193. See ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS
9–10 (Harriman House Ltd. 2007) (1776) (“It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the
brewer, or the baker, that we expect our dinner, but from their regard to their own interest.”).
194. See Korsmo & Myers, supra note 52, at 314 (describing restrictions on buying and selling
claims as having “deep common law roots”).
195. See, e.g., 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *134–36 (explaining that both
barratry, or excessive filings, and champerty, or the process of financing a lawsuit in which one
has no interest other than the potential proceeds, were punished significantly by English common
law); Choharis, supra note 143, at 461 (defining champerty as supporting a lawsuit “in hopes of
profiting” and explaining that this practice was particularly disincentivized in early Rome,
thirteenth and fourteenth century England, and during the reign of Henry VIII); Max Radin,
Maintenance by Champerty, 24 CALIF. L. REV. 48, 60–63 (1935) (“It was clear that a purchaser in
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specialized patent litigation firms—commonly referred to as “patent
trolls”—and the more recent emergence of appraisal arbitrage.196
Hostility toward such plaintiffs serves as a deterrent against
serving as lead plaintiff, and drives at least some of the general
limitations on plaintiff incentive awards. It would hardly be irrational
to worry that courts would look unkindly upon specialist, repeat-player,
litigation-focused investment funds. To the extent distaste for
professional plaintiffs leads courts to be unwilling to reward such funds
via adequate plaintiff incentive awards, it creates a disincentive to
create a specialist fund in the first place.
Courts should not hesitate to reward an effective lead plaintiff
that has produced benefits for the class simply because it is a repeat
player. Moreover, courts should hesitate to apply archaic doctrines like
champerty, maintenance, and barratry197 to security holders who buy
the security after a cause of action has arisen, with the intent to pursue
litigation.198 Abolishing such doctrines would be in keeping with the
“general trend . . . away from restrictions on claim alienation,
beginning with the legalization of contingency fees, which were
themselves once regarded as champertous.”199
In addition, the contemporaneous ownership requirement
should be abandoned. In Delaware, this rule requires derivative
plaintiffs to have been a stockholder at the time of the original alleged
wrongdoing200 and casts doubt on whether an after-acquiring

all likelihood paid far below the price which would have been demanded if the land were in
possession, and the whole transaction in medieval eyes was tainted with that speculation which
was the essence of the abhorred sin of usury.”).
196. See Merion Capital LP v. BMC Software, Inc., No. 8900-VCG, 2015 WL 67586, at *7 (Del.
Ch. Jan. 5, 2015) (acknowledging concerns “that appraisal arbitrage itself leads to unwholesome
litigation”); Letter from Cravath, Swaine & Moore LLP, Davis Polk & Wardwell LLP, Latham &
Watkins LLP, Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP, Simpson Thacher & Bartlett LLP,
Sullivan & Cromwell LLP, and Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz, to the Council of the Corp. Law
Section of the Del. State Bar Ass’n and Lawrence A. Hamermesh, Professor, Widener’s Inst. of Del.
(Apr. 1, 2015) (on file with author) (decrying “unseemly claims-buying that is rampant and serves
no legitimate . . . purpose”). Appraisal arbitrage refers to the practice of buying shares of a merger
target following announcement of a merger, with the intention of bringing a statutory-appraisal
action seeking the fair value of those shares. See Charles R. Korsmo & Minor Myers, Appraisal
Arbitrage and the Future of Public Company M&A, 92 WASH. U. L. REV. 1551, 1552–56 (2015).
197. Blackstone defined barratry as “frequently exciting and stirring up suits and quarrels.” 4
BLACKSTONE, supra note 195, at *134; see also Korsmo & Myers, supra note 3, at 1343 (“Roughly
speaking, ‘barratry’ refers to a third party stirring up a lawsuit among others . . . .”).
198. We have argued elsewhere that these ancient laws “serve no useful purpose in modern
society.” Korsmo & Myers, supra note 3, at 1382.
199. Id. at 1344.
200. See DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 8, § 327 (2019) (requiring that a derivative stockholder allege
that it held the stock “at the time of the transaction of which such stockholder complains or that
such stockholder’s stock thereafter devolved upon such stockholder by operation of law”).
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stockholder can serve as lead plaintiff in a class action.201 Other
jurisdictions have similar rules. The policy behind the
contemporaneous ownership requirement is somewhat murky,202 but it
appears to be designed to suppress nuisance litigation. If this is the
goal, however, the contemporaneous ownership requirement is likely to
be counterproductive. By limiting the universe of potential lead
plaintiffs to those who happened to own stock at the time of the alleged
wrongdoing, the rule freezes out specialized institutional investors with
expertise in identifying and managing claims. The rule thus stands as
a barrier to the entrance of the most promising type of highly qualified
and effective lead plaintiffs, who could prevent collusive settlements of
meritorious suits and generate benefits for all stockholders.203
Finally, while it is reasonably clear that for stock, any
underlying legal claims transfer along with the shares, most states have
a general rule that legal claims do not transfer along with property
unless the assignor “manifest[s] an intention to transfer the right.”204
This rule has been applied to, for example, corporate bonds and assetbacked securities.205 While this rule is not an absolute bar on an afteracquirer bringing claims—they can overcome it by having the seller
manifest intent to transfer claims—it is an unnecessary obstacle to the
creation of a specialized, high-quality lead plaintiff.206 Where the assets
201. See, e.g., Dieter v. Prime Comput., Inc., 681 A.2d 1068, 1072–73 (Del. Ch. 1996) (holding
that an after-acquiring stockholder should not serve as lead plaintiff due to concerns as to whether
they can be considered “typical of the class”); see also Korsmo & Myers, supra note 3, at 1357–58
(“Delaware law has not squarely confronted the question of whether after-acquiring stockholders
are members of a merger class action . . . . Given this uncertainty . . . such stockholders have been
precluded from serving as lead plaintiff in a merger class action.”).
202. Other, more influential, commentators have examined the rationales behind the
contemporaneous ownership requirement and found them wanting. See, e.g., J. Travis Laster,
Goodbye to the Contemporaneous Ownership Requirement, 33 DEL. J. CORP. L. 673, 673 (2008)
(arguing that the requirement “is fundamentally incoherent” and that it “operates largely at
random, and it arbitrarily mandates the dismissal of potentially meritorious claims”); Macey &
Miller, supra note 2, at 77 (“The rationale for the contemporaneous ownership rule . . . appears
questionable at best.”).
203. See Korsmo & Myers, supra note 3, at 1383 (criticizing the contemporaneous ownership
requirement for generating an “artificial scarcity” of suitable lead plaintiffs); id. (“The ironic result
is that a policy purportedly instituted to avoid strike suits may, in fact, be blocking pursuit of
meritorious claims while doing little to prevent strike suits.”).
204. See, e.g., DNAML Pty, Ltd. v. Apple Inc., No. 13cv6516 (DLC), 2015 WL 9077075, at *4
(S.D.N.Y. Dec. 16, 2015) (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 324 (2019)).
205. See Royal Park Invs. SA/NV v. HSBC Bank USA, N.A., No. 14 Civ. 8175, 14 Civ. 9366,
2018 WL 679495, at *4–5 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 1, 2018) (“A certificateholder has standing to sue only if
every prior transaction in the chain included an assignment of the right to sue along with the
underlying certificate.”).
206. Cf. Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 628 (2001) (“It would be illogical, and unfair,
to bar a regulatory takings claim because of the post-enactment transfer of ownership where the
steps necessary to make the claim ripe were not taken, or could not have been taken, by a previous
owner.”), abrogated on other grounds by Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., 544 U.S. 528 (2005).
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have changed hands multiple times, it can be difficult or impossible to
determine who owns any appurtenant claims.207 States should adopt
rules like New York’s default rule that all preexisting claims transfer
along with the underlying bonds.208
E. The Judicial Backstop
In all events, plaintiff incentive awards have a built-in
gatekeeper—the trial court judge. The trial court judge already must
approve any settlement in representative litigation, as well as any
awards to the lead plaintiff and the plaintiffs’ attorneys. As is discussed
more fully below, the conflicts of interest that must be policed in the
context of plaintiff incentive awards are broadly similar to those that
arise with attorneys’ fees. If anything, the agency problem is less acute
for the lead plaintiff.
In the presence of this natural gatekeeper, the need for brightline rules—against after-acquiring lead plaintiffs, against percentagebased incentive awards, against ex ante agreements with class counsel,
and so on—is highly attenuated. The trial judge simply needs discretion
to bar such practices on a case-by-case basis, if and when they threaten
to have deleterious effects on the class.
F. The Promise of Specialized Lead Plaintiffs in Corporate and
Securities Claims
Any sophisticated institutional lead plaintiff would likely be a
boon to the class, as compared to an unsophisticated figurehead. But a
lead plaintiff that specializes in serving in that role holds out unique
benefits. Such funds can offer economies of scale, the risk-reducing
benefits of diversification across many claims, and can develop greater
expertise in identifying and resolving claims (as well as monitoring the
plaintiffs’ attorneys).209 Specialists can “vindicate the underlying legal
rights more effectively and thus make the claims more valuable.”210

207. See id. at 626–30 (discussing the potential effects of applying different property rights to
different owners after property has been transferred).
208. See N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 13-107(1) (McKinney 2019) (“Unless expressly reserved in
writing, a transfer of any bond shall vest in the transferee all claims or demands of the transferrer,
whether or not such claims or demands are known to exist . . . for damages against the trustee or
depositary under any indenture under which such bond was issued.”).
209. Jill Fisch identified similar benefits arising from the work of relators in qui tam suits.
Fisch, supra note 5, at 195 (“Three components of the plaintiff’s role add value: initiating litigation,
providing information and investigative assistance, and providing litigation resources and
support.”).
210. Korsmo & Myers, supra note 52, at 315.
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Doing so would not only benefit the specialist and other class members,
but also the original (selling) holder of the claims and the deterrent
function of class actions more generally.211
Any investment security is highly likely to have at least one
substantial institutional holder, given that the proportion of S&P 500
stocks held by institutional investors now exceeds 80%.212 The PSLRA’s
unique limitations on corporate and securities claims are thus
especially striking because it is precisely in those claims where one
might otherwise expect to see a sophisticated potential lead plaintiff.
These institutional investors—with large resources at their command,
and usually substantial financial and legal sophistication—hold out
promise as something other than the usual figurehead plaintiff.213
Even where a promising lead plaintiff does not exist at the time
a claim arises, one can come into existence after the fact relatively
easily in the corporate and securities context. Where a valuable claim
exists, a specialized investor can increase its exposure by acquiring
assignments of the claims from class members.214 Indeed, litigationfocused funds can specialize in buying and bringing such claims. This
further sets apart corporate and securities actions from other aggregate
litigation contexts. While, in theory, after-acquiring specialists could
buy up other types of claims as well, the ability to do so by simply buying
securities on established markets or by taking assignments from claim
holders dramatically reduces the transaction costs associated with
doing so in the corporate and securities context.215
The potential utility of an institutional lead plaintiff stems in
part from their financial and legal sophistication, and in part from the
financial resources likely to be at their disposal. This offers
straightforward benefits in identifying claims, prosecuting them, and
monitoring counsel.

211. Id.
212. See Einer Elhauge, Horizontal Shareholding, 129 HARV. L. REV. 1267, 1268 (2016)
(“[I]nstitutional investors like BlackRock, Vanguard, Fidelity, and State Street now own around
80% of all stock in S&P 500 corporations.”).
213. See Weiss & Beckerman, supra note 7, at 2121–23 (positing that institutional investors’
involvement as lead plaintiff in class action suits may aid in the advancement of the disclosure
policies of the federal securities laws).
214. See Korsmo & Myers, supra note 3, at 1353 (“Would-be class members could sell their
claims to buyers who specialize in evaluating and pressing claims. Having accumulated a large
number of similar claims, the buyer could then press them on its own behalf.”).
215. See id. at 1382–83 (explaining the superiority of after-the-fact acquisition in the
stockholder context relative to other types of class actions).
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1. Identifying Meritorious Claims
Unlike in many class action scenarios, the lead plaintiff in a
complex corporate or securities case may be vital in identifying and
crafting the claim in the first place. For many class actions, whatever
their factual complexity, the underlying claims are relatively
straightforward and do not require much sophistication on the part of
the plaintiffs’ lawyers in order to craft a complaint. This tends to lead
to the scenario described in much of the literature on class actions and
decried in the legislative history of the PSLRA—plaintiffs’ attorneys
who select lead plaintiffs, rather than the other way around, and lead
plaintiffs who play little or no role in the actual litigation.216 This can
be the case even in corporate and securities litigation.217
Some strong cases, however, may lie buried in the proverbial
haystack. They might hinge on difficult questions of valuation or
complex webs of contractual arrangements that defy explication on the
front page of the Wall Street Journal. Some set of claims may thus lie
beyond the practical ability of generalists to identify on their own.218 To
be sure, other types of claims like employment discrimination or
products liability may also remain undetected but for the efforts of a
particularly active plaintiff. But the complexities of many corporate and
securities claims make it especially likely in that context. A few
examples will make the point clear.

216. See H.R. CONF. REP. 104-369, at 32–33 (1995) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N.
730, 732–33 (describing “[p]rofessional plaintiffs who own a nominal number of shares in a wide
array of public companies” and noting that “in many cases the ‘lead plaintiff’ has not even read the
complaint”); see, e.g., Korsmo & Myers, supra note 2, at 841 (“As a practical matter, then, it is the
plaintiffs’ attorneys . . . who decide when to initiate [class and derivative] claims, how to prosecute
them, and on what terms to settle them.”); Macey & Miller, supra note 2, at 3 (“[P]laintiffs’ class
and derivative attorneys . . . exercise nearly plenary control over all important decisions in the
lawsuit.”).
217. See, e.g., Janet Cooper Alexander, Do the Merits Matter? A Study of Settlements in
Securities Class Actions, 43 STAN. L. REV. 497, 565 (1991) (“Many plaintiffs’ firms have longterm
relationships with certain investors with broad-spectrum portfolios who are regularly plaintiffs in
class actions.”); Matthew D. Cain & Steven Davidoff Solomon, A Great Game: The Dynamics of
State Competition and Litigation, 100 IOWA L. REV. 465, 480 (2015) (noting that “[t]he drivers of
merger litigation are shareholder plaintiffs’ attorneys’ firms” and that “shareholder litigation is a
lawyer-driven process rather than one that is operated for the benefit of shareholders” ); Roberta
Romano, The Shareholder Suit: Litigation Without Foundation?, 7 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 55, 55–56
(1991) (“Critics of the shareholder suit assert that most of the suits are frivolous and that the
plaintiff’s bar is the true beneficiary of the litigation.”).
218. See, e.g., MBS ‘Putback’ Investors Target Big Issuers, CERTIFIED FORENSIC LOAN
AUDITORS (Feb. 24, 2012), https://certifiedforensicloanauditors.com/articles/02.12/MBS-putbackinvestors-target-big-issuers.html [https://perma.cc/5VUC-ABDK] (noting, in the context of
mortgage-backed security putback litigation, that it is “far from easy money” and that “it requires
considerable manpower to pore over detailed loan files in search of flaws”).
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The asset-backed securities that were especially popular prior to
the financial crisis are legendary in their complexity.219 The details of
the underlying assets can be, realistically, only partially disclosed in
publicly available prospectuses, and the underlying contractual
arrangements are bewilderingly complex, running to hundreds or
thousands of pages.220 In the wake of the financial crisis, when many
such securities became distressed, potential claims against issuers,
trustees, and other parties abounded. Without dedicated assistance
from the sophisticated institutional investors who held the securities,
however, the chances of nonspecialist litigators getting their arms
around the economic and contractual realities involved would have been
slim to none. Indeed, many of the more sophisticated contractual claims
brought in the wake of the crisis have been by specialist funds that have
accumulated the securities specifically in order to assert legal rights.221
Even more standard corporate bonds will be governed by
indentures that typically run into the hundreds of pages and may be
largely impenetrable to the nonspecialist. Unless an issuer or trustee
breaches the indenture in a particularly flamboyant fashion, its actions
are unlikely to feature in the financial press to get on the radar of a
plaintiffs’ attorney, and perhaps might not be noticed by anyone at all
except a particularly vigilant bondholder. Unless such bondholders are
willing to spearhead litigation themselves, many potentially
meritorious claims will never be identified in the first place, and many
unspectacular breaches of contract are likely to go undetected and
undeterred.
2. Assisting in Complex Litigation
Just as it may be difficult for a nonspecialist litigator to discover
claims and craft a compelling complaint without assistance from an
expert lead plaintiff, an expert lead plaintiff may also be vital to
actually prosecuting the resulting litigation. Tasks ranging from
formulating discovery requests, interpreting documents produced
219. See, e.g., Henry T. C. Hu, Too Complex to Depict? Innovation, “Pure Information,” and the
SEC Disclosure Paradigm, 90 TEX. L. REV. 1601, 1628–29 (2012) (demonstrating that modern-day
financial practices, including those involving asset-backed securities, are becoming increasingly
complex); Charles R. Korsmo, The Audience for Corporate Disclosure, 102 IOWA L. REV. 1581, 1618
(2017) (describing asset-backed securities as “emblematic of the new complexity of structured
finance”).
220. See Hu, supra note 219, at 1634–36 (describing the information problems in offering
asset-backed securities); id. at 1640 (explaining the partial and sometimes inaccurate descriptions
of complex underlying contracts in asset-backed securities prospectuses).
221. See, e.g., MBS ‘Putback’ Investors Target Big Issuers, supra note 218 (“A growing number
of hedge funds are scouring the files of securitized home loans, in hopes of reaping rich profits by
forcing mortgage-bond issuers to buy back faulty credits.”).

Korsmo Myers_PAGE

1966

11/18/2019 6:47 AM

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 72:6:1923

during discovery, preparing for depositions, selecting and preparing
expert witnesses, valuing the potential recovery, and even writing
briefs and preparing trial strategy may be difficult or impossible for
counsel to perform without the assistance of a lead plaintiff
knowledgeable in the context of the litigation. The Chen case described
earlier illustrates this point dramatically.
3. Monitoring Class Counsel
Agency problems are endemic in all types of representative
litigation and need to be monitored, either by courts or by the plaintiffs
themselves.222 The evidence suggests, however, that the agency
problem is especially acute in corporate and securities litigation and
that such cases offer a better prospect of effective monitoring by an
effective lead plaintiff.
The prevalence of collusive settlements in stockholder litigation
is well documented in the literature.223 The most salient recent example
involves merger class actions, where transactions were awash in socalled “disclosure only” settlements, where the only “recovery” was
additional disclosures by the defendant—and a substantial payment to
the plaintiffs’ attorneys.224 These disclosure-only settlements are
especially likely to be collusive in nature.225 The plaintiffs’ lawyers get
a tidy payout for little effort, and the defendants secure broad releases
of claims at low cost—less than the cost of litigating even a frivolous
claim.226 As a result, frivolous claims abound, and potentially
meritorious claims are settled on the cheap.227
These collusive settlements have been particularly difficult for
courts to police, given the ease with which the parties can put together
an impressive-looking package of additional disclosures and—in some
types of stockholder suits—various governance reforms (additional

222. See Korsmo & Myers, supra note 3, at 1333 (“The unavoidable problem created by both
the class action and the derivative suit is one of agency costs.”).
223. An early study by Roberta Romano found that only half of settlements led to any
monetary recovery for stockholders, while more than 90% provided for cash attorneys’ fees.
Romano, supra note 217, at 61.
224. Cain & Solomon, supra note 217, at 479–81.
225. See Joel Edan Friedlander, How Rural/Metro Exposed the Systemic Problem of Disclosure
Settlements, 40 DEL. J. CORP. L. 877, 881–83 (2016) (proposing that the routine use of disclosure
settlements “undermined in various respects the proper functioning of a system for the judicial
enforcement of fiduciary duties”).
226. See Sean J. Griffith & Alexandra D. Lahav, The Market for Preclusion in Merger
Litigation, 66 VAND. L. REV. 1053, 1057–58 (2013).
227. Our own recent empirical study suggested that merger claims were being brought over
the past decade with no regard for the underlying merits of the claims. Korsmo & Myers, supra
note 2, at 847.
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independent directors, a new audit committee, and so on). While
academic research has suggested that these nonmonetary settlements
are generally of little or no value,228 it can be difficult for a judge to
determine whether a complicated package of disclosures and
governance reforms is truly valuable or mere window dressing.229
It is also particularly easy for plaintiffs’ attorneys to evade
monitoring by maintaining a stable of pliant “professional” plaintiffs for
stockholder litigation, in a way that would seldom be possible in other
contexts. To have standing, a plaintiff must simply be a stockholder. In
the extreme, an individual could, at relatively low cost, own a single
share of every publicly traded company and thus have standing in every
stockholder suit involving a public company. And, indeed, prominent
plaintiffs’ firms have been accused of keeping such clients essentially
on retainer, offering them side payments to serve as plaintiffs in
stockholder suits filed by the firm.230 Such a plaintiff is unlikely to be
willing or able to perform any real monitoring.
Large institutions with sufficient legal and financial
sophistication, by contrast, could be effective monitors,231 keeping a
sharp eye on the litigation and the choices made by counsel. This
dynamic is on display in stockholder appraisal, where most claims are
brought by specialist funds who buy stock after the challenged merger
has been announced.232
IV. POTENTIAL OBJECTIONS
At this point, it may seem unlikely to the reader that any fairminded, educated person could raise objections to our proposals. But
this is a fallen world. In this Part, we consider—and reject—potential
objections to a more robust use of plaintiff incentive awards in pursuit
of high-quality lead plaintiffs. In general, the various objections ring
228. See Jill E. Fisch et al., Confronting the Peppercorn Settlement in Merger Litigation: An
Empirical Analysis and a Proposal for Reform, 93 TEX. L. REV. 557, 559 (2015) (“Although deal
litigation is pervasive, these lawsuits rarely result in a monetary recovery for the plaintiff class.”).
229. Given this difficulty, and the mounting evidence of abusive merger litigation, Delaware
courts have recently decided to err on the side of rejecting disclosure-only settlements in merger
litigation. See In re Trulia, Inc. Stockholder Litig., 129 A.3d 884, 898 (Del. Ch. 2016) (holding that,
going forward, disclosure-only settlements are disfavored and will be approved only where
additional disclosures are “plainly material” and releases of liability are “narrowly circumscribed”).
230. See Press Release, Debra Wong Yang, U.S. Attorney, Cent. Dist. of Cal., Milberg Weiss
Law Firm, Two Senior Partners Indicted in Secret Kickback Scheme Involving Named Plaintiffs
in Class-Action Lawsuits (May 16, 2006), https://online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/
milbergpress05182006.pdf [https://perma.cc/RSA7-P86G].
231. See Weiss & Beckerman, supra note 7, at 2109–25 (analyzing the factors that may
determine whether an institutional investor will choose to serve as lead plaintiff in litigation).
232. See Korsmo & Myers, supra note 196, at 1552–56.
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hollow for two reasons. First, they prove too much. If they were taken
seriously, they would in most cases apply even more forcefully against
contingency fees for plaintiffs’ attorneys. Second, they are overwrought
in a context where trial court judges are well situated to provide
oversight against abuses.
A. Plaintiff Incentive Awards Misalign Incentives
The most basic objection to providing an economically
meaningful incentive award to lead plaintiffs is that doing so would
distort the lead plaintiffs’ incentives and risk causing them to sell out
the class to enter into collusive settlements.233 If anything, however,
this risk is far less acute for an institutional lead plaintiff than for a
plaintiffs’ attorney.234 Absent a percentage-based fee, a plaintiffs’
attorney has no economic stake in the actual recovery at all. As a result,
the temptation is especially strong to strike a collusive settlement that
provides only symbolic relief for the plaintiffs but a cash payment for
the attorneys. Indeed, such “coupon settlements” and “disclosure-only”
settlements have plagued representative litigation.235 The attorneys’
incentive for a quick settlement is heightened by the fact that the
upfront costs of filing a suit are small—often no more than the cost of
filing a quick complaint—with major costs only being incurred if the
case is actually litigated.
By contrast, an institutional lead plaintiff, by definition, will
have a large stake in the actual recovery. The desire to maximize the
value of this stake will tend to counteract the incentive to reach a lowvalue settlement in hopes of an award, unless the prospective award is
extremely large. Moreover, unlike a plaintiffs’ attorney, an institutional
lead plaintiff must make a substantial upfront investment in amassing
a position in the first place—in appraisal litigation it is not uncommon
for specialist funds to spend tens or even hundreds of millions of dollars
establishing their stock holdings. This upfront investment reduces the
incentive to either bring a meritless suit for nuisance value or to reach
a quick, low-value settlement of a meritorious claim.236 The skewing of
233. See discussion supra notes 41–42 and accompanying text.
234. See Cox, Thomas & Kiku, supra note 7, at 1593 (“[A] settlement offer that provided
recovery of the attorney’s tangible and opportunity costs could loom larger than the prospect of
aggressively pursuing the action to a more lucrative prospective judgment or settlement.”); Fisch
et al., supra note 228, at 568–622 (discussing the problem in the context of stockholder class actions
challenging mergers); James Tharin & Brian Blockovich, Coupons and the Class Action Fairness
Act, 18 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1443, 1445–47 (2005) (discussing the problem in the context of
consumer and antitrust class actions).
235. See Tharin & Blockovich, supra note 234, at 1445–47.
236. See Korsmo & Myers, supra note 3, at 1335–37.
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incentives is much less with respect to an institutional lead plaintiff
than for a plaintiffs’ attorney or for a traditional lead plaintiff with a
small stake in the underlying claim and the prospect of a lump-sum
incentive award.
If—as we propose above—plaintiff incentive awards for
institutional investor lead plaintiffs are typically calculated as a
percentage of the recovery, the misalignment of incentives is reduced
even further. The lead plaintiffs’ award will simply scale with the
recovery to the class. Furthermore, a percentage-based award puts the
amount of the award entirely in the hands of the supervising judge who
must approve the settlement and determine an appropriate percentage
award. In the presence of an ex ante agreement among the lead
plaintiffs and attorneys on the splitting of a prospective award, the
judge can simply determine the percentage award in the same fashion
as would be done normally. In all cases, the presiding judge can police
the settlement237 just as they would in other circumstances where a risk
of collusion is present.238 Only in extraordinary circumstances would an
award be justified in the absence of a monetary recovery.
B. Lead Plaintiffs Seldom Merit a Significant Award
The drafters of the PSLRA were particularly perturbed by the
prevalence of figurehead lead plaintiffs,239 forbidding lead plaintiffs in
securities class actions from receiving any incentive award beyond pure
restitution. The PSLRA is at least half right: where the lead plaintiff
has served no more than a nominal role, they should receive no more
than a nominal award, if any. But the fact that most lead plaintiffs do
little to benefit the class is no reason to swear off rewarding the rare
lead plaintiffs who do a great deal to benefit the class. By definition, the
institutional lead plaintiffs we have in mind will be anything but
figureheads. If, however, they can expect no reward for benefitting the
class, they will have no reason to do so rather than proceeding
individually. Ironically, the resolve to treat all lead plaintiffs as nothing

237. See, e.g., Ann K. Wooster, Annotation, Propriety of Incentive Awards or Incentive
Agreements in Class Actions, 60 A.L.R. 6th 295, § 4 (2010) (“The decision of whether to grant an
incentive award to a named plaintiff in a class action following conclusion of the litigation is within
a court’s discretion.”).
238. See, e.g., In re Trulia, Inc. Stockholder Litig., 129 A.3d 884, 898 (Del. Ch. 2016) (discussing
the problem of collusive settlements in merger class actions, and implementing increased scrutiny
of such settlements).
239. See H.R. REP. NO. 104-369, at 32–33 (1995) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N.
730, 732–33 (noting, in support of the limitations on incentive awards, that “in many cases the
‘lead plaintiff’ has not even read the complaint”).
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more than figureheads makes it more likely that only figureheads will
be willing to serve as lead plaintiffs.240
C. Large Incentive Awards Will Encourage Rent Seeking
A third concern is that lead plaintiffs will engage in rent-seeking
behavior, either in the form of threatening a class action to secure a
larger settlement in an individual suit or in the form of selecting as
class counsel the firm who will agree to give them the biggest slice of
the award rather than the firm that will best represent the class.241
Neither of these concerns hits the mark.
As to the first type of “rent seeking,” the value of the threat to
bring a class action does not depend on whether there is a potential
incentive award in the class action. Indeed, the prospect of a substantial
incentive award should help to induce large plaintiffs to actually
proceed on a class basis, rather than simply use the threat of a class
action as leverage in an individual action. If that threat is credible—
indeed, if the plaintiff even contemplates proceeding individually—it
proves the insufficiency of the plaintiff incentive award regime.
As to the second type of “rent seeking,” it is subject to powerful
countervailing incentives in this context. The type of institutional lead
plaintiff we envision will have a large stake in the underlying claims,
giving them an incentive to select class counsel who will maximize the
value of those claims, after factoring in costs. In addition, if the lead
plaintiff has negotiated for a portion of a percentage-based award,
maximizing the award will also depend on maximizing the recovery.242
240. We are not the first to note this irony, which is especially rich in the context of the PSLRA,
which itself creates a legal framework to prevent figurehead lead plaintiffs. See Nagareda, supra
note 32, at 1491:
The PSLRA hinders the practical achievement of its own ideals for class representatives
by confining incentive awards to restitution and rejecting complementary notions of
reward. By limiting awards to “reasonable costs and expenses,” the PSLRA seeks to
fight the proverbial last war—to respond to perceived abuses in the pre-PSLRA era
rather than to design a legal framework for awards under the changed arrangements
for lead plaintiffs promoted by the PSLRA itself.
241. See Cox, Thomas & Kiku, supra note 7, at 1593.
242. This stands in contrast to the situation where, being unable to secure benefits within the
litigation via an incentive award, lead plaintiffs instead seek to extract benefits from prospective
lead counsel outside the litigation. See Stephen J. Choi et al., The Price of Pay to Play in Securities
Class Actions, 8 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 650 (2011) (describing evidence that public pension
funds use their power to select lead counsel under the PSLRA to solicit campaign contributions).
But see David H. Webber, Is “Pay-to-Play” Driving Public Pension Fund Activism in Securities
Class Actions?: An Empirical Study, 90 B.U. L. REV. 2031, 2032 (2010) (finding that “evidence
suggests that beneficiary board members (not politicians) drive [such] cases for reasons having to
do with the financial soundness of the fund”). As Silver and Dinkin note, the irony of the pay-toplay allegations is that they prove that stronger incentives can be effective in inducing class
members to serve as lead plaintiff. Silver & Dinkin, supra note 9, at 488 (“Although widely
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Again, the incentive will be to hire counsel best able to assist in doing
so. The lead plaintiff’s position will be little different from an individual
litigant seeking to choose a lawyer that provides an optimal mix of cost
and quality. This is especially so for lead plaintiffs who choose to simply
pay by the hour in exchange for the entire incentive award.
Viewed more broadly, the concern with “rent-seeking” behavior
is wrongheaded in general. Control of a successful class action confers
substantial financial returns.243 But these returns are created by the
law, and they exist for a reason. They provide an incentive for bringing
representative litigation in the first place, which is thought to generate
public benefits, including improved deterrence of wrongdoing and
compensation for the wronged.244 One may call these financial returns
“rents,” but if private actors are to be expected to generate positive
externalities, they must be entitled to internalize at least some of the
benefits they generate. The patent system, for example, is based on this
simple idea, and indeed so is the American system of private property
more generally. This has long been recognized as applied to plaintiffs’
attorneys, who are typically assumed to be vital to generating the
benefits of aggregate litigation. We merely propose extending the same
treatment to lead plaintiffs when they are vital to achieving the desired
public benefits. Current practice allows plaintiffs’ attorneys to
monopolize the “rents” from aggregate litigation, despite the fact that
their incentives may diverge considerably from those of the class. Our
proposal would merely allow particularly useful lead plaintiffs—whose
incentives are otherwise aligned with those of the class—to get a cut of
the action.
D. Awarding a Share of the Contingency Fee Will Generate Disputes
Some courts, particularly in Delaware, have expressed concern
that incentive awards to lead plaintiffs will necessarily involve judges
in disputes between lead plaintiffs’ and plaintiffs’ attorneys.245 This
despised, political contributions have an important upside: they provide selective incentives for
trustees to volunteer public sector and union funds as lead plaintiffs.”).
243. See, e.g., Nagareda, supra note 32, at 1494 (noting the “considerable financial returns
that flow from control of class action litigation”).
244. See, e.g., Coffee, supra note 1, at 218 (“The conventional theory of the private attorney
general stresses that the role of private litigation is not simply to secure compensation for victims,
but is at least equally to generate deterrence, principally by multiplying the total resources
committed to the detection and prosecution of the prohibited behavior.”).
245. See Chen v. Howard-Anderson, 2017 Del. Ch. LEXIS 734, at *11 (Del. Ch. June 30, 2017)
(citing Transcript of Record at *33–34, In re Commercial Assets, Inc. S’holders Litig., No. 17402
(Del. Ch. Aug. 3, 2000) (Strine, V.C.) (“I don’t think we ought to start individually compensating
named plaintiffs in every sort of litigation. . . . [W]e don’t want them to become sort of a rival or a
coordinated kind of fee application on behalf of named plaintiffs.”)).
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concern is unconvincing. Courts deal on a routine basis with cases
involving more than one plaintiffs’ firm litigating in pursuit of a
percentage-based contingency award. In many, perhaps most, of those
cases, the firms—as sophisticated economic actors—negotiate among
themselves how the eventual award (determined by the court) will be
divided.246 Where they cannot agree, the judge determines the
allocation, based on a rough appraisal of the firms’ relative
contributions.247
There is thus no reason to expect rival award applications on a
routine basis. When a sophisticated institutional investor serves as lead
plaintiff, it is, as we argue above, also likely they will negotiate ahead
of time with counsel regarding how any percentage-based award will be
split. If anything, rival applications from a lead plaintiff are less likely
than from a rival firm, given that the lead plaintiff will have chosen the
lead counsel in the first place. Where no such agreement exists, though,
the court is perfectly able to determine an appropriate split, just as
when two rival firms have a dispute. This may, in fact, be an easier
proposition than attempting to calculate a precise dollar amount for an
incentive award. In the Chen case, for example,248 rather than just
cataloguing Chen’s contributions and trying to value them in a vacuum,
the Vice Chancellor could have compared Chen’s contributions to those
of the plaintiffs’ firms and arrived at a rough proportion, dividing the
award accordingly.
E. Ex Ante Agreements Allocating Incentive Fees
Will Lead to Abuse
Many of the rebuttals offered thus far depend, at least in part,
on sophisticated lead plaintiffs being able to bargain ex ante with
plaintiffs’ firms over how any percentage-based award will be divided.
Such agreements would represent the outcome of bargaining between
sophisticated parties, based on their appraisal of the relative
contribution of the lead plaintiffs and the plaintiffs’ attorneys to the
case. As such, they would free courts from having to make difficult
allocative decisions themselves when determining awards.
Professor Rubenstein, however, highlights a number of
objections to ex ante agreements, drawing from a case out of the U.S.

246. See 5 RUBENSTEIN, supra note 4, § 15:23 (discussing the process by which attorneys’ fees
are negotiated among class counsel).
247. See id. (stating three situations when a judge will oversee the award allocation, the first
of which is a lack of agreement among attorneys within the class).
248. See supra Section I.F.
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Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.249 Several of the objections are
ill-founded on their face. The district court, for example, worried that
such agreements “encourage figurehead cases and bounty payments by
potential class counsel.”250 This is exactly backwards—it is the prospect
of sharing in the reward that gives a lead plaintiff an incentive to be an
active monitor and participant, rather than sitting back and remaining
a figurehead. Similarly, the Ninth Circuit worried that “[i]f allowed, ex
ante incentive agreements could tempt potential plaintiffs to sell their
lawsuits to attorneys who are the highest bidders.”251 Left unexplained
is why a plaintiff should not sell its lawsuit to the highest bidder, just
as it sells its house to the highest bidder.
Other criticisms of ex ante agreements are tautological. The
district court, for example, concluded that such agreements are
improper because “they create at least the appearance of
impropriety.”252 Relatedly, both the district and circuit courts expressed
concern that such agreements violated ethical rules on fee sharing with
clients.253 While the courts, of course, are bound to enforce such rules,
the rules themselves are not self-justifying. That is, it is no good to say
that ex ante agreements should be against the rules because they are
against the rules. The real question is whether ex ante agreements
should be against the rules.
Still other criticisms are rooted in the specifics of the case. The
ex ante agreement in question envisioned an award that rose with the
recovery but was subject to a cap.254 Both courts pointed out that this
structure distorted the plaintiff’s incentives, giving them no incentive
to seek injunctive relief or a recovery above the cap.255 Similarly, both
courts faulted the parties for not disclosing the agreement to either the
class or the court.256 These are valid criticisms, and good reasons for
disfavoring the agreement at issue in the case, but they are not good
reasons for disfavoring ex ante agreements generally. The type of
agreements we have in mind would simply allocate the percentagebased award the court would grant anyway. As such, the lead plaintiff
would simply have the same incentives a plaintiffs’ attorney already
has—to achieve an outcome that the court believes beneficial enough to
249. See 5 RUBENSTEIN, supra note 4, § 17:17 (discussing Rodriguez v. West Publishing Corp.,
563 F.3d 948 (9th Cir. 2009)).
250. Rodriguez v. W. Publ’g Corp., No. CV05-3222 R (MCx), 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 74767, at
*70 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 10, 2007), rev’d in part, Rodriguez, 563 F.3d 948.
251. Rodriguez, 563 F.3d at 960.
252. Id. at 959.
253. Id.
254. Id. at 957.
255. Id. at 959–60.
256. Id. at 959.
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justify as large an award as possible. Courts could also require
agreements to be disclosed at the outset and could invalidate
problematic provisions if necessary.
A final criticism of ex ante agreements—and of percentagebased awards generally—is that they can result in “an arbitrary award
not reflective of the amount of work done, or the risks undertaken, or
the time spent on the litigation.”257 Again, this criticism is inapplicable
to the type of allocation agreement we envision. Such an agreement
simply specifies how the award is to be split, not how it is calculated.
The court would still determine the total amount to award the lead
plaintiff–attorney team and could consider whatever factors are
appropriate in the case. In general, however, we expect it will be most
appropriate to place the greatest weight on the benefit achieved for the
class, as doing so creates the best incentives for the lead plaintiff–
attorney team to maximize that benefit.258
F. Claims-Buying and Bounty Hunting Is Super Yucky
The argument—if it can be called that—that large incentive
awards to sophisticated professional lead plaintiffs would be unseemly
has at least two components. First, incentive award practices of the type
we suggest would lead to awards that are “too large,” diverting
compensation that rightfully belongs to the class. And second, claims
buying and litigation for profit are themselves unwholesome.
As to the first component, it is true that our proposals would
result in lead plaintiffs receiving awards much larger than those now
commonly given. It is not the case, however, that our proposals would
result in diversion of compensation from the class. Rather, they would
result in diversion of resources away from defendants, and perhaps as
a second order effect a diversion of compensation from plaintiffs’
attorneys for providing financing. The gross award would be calculated
in the same old way. But rather than going entirely (or almost entirely)
to the plaintiffs’ attorneys—on the assumption that they were
predominantly responsible for the benefit to the class—it would also be
allocated to the lead plaintiff when the lead plaintiff also played a
substantial role.
We have addressed the arguments about the supposed
unseemliness of claims buying and litigation for profit at length
elsewhere.259 These arguments are increasingly divorced from
257. Id.
258. See discussion supra note 173 and accompanying text.
259. See Korsmo & Myers, supra note 3 (discussing settlement and contingency fees).

Korsmo Myers_PAGE

2019]

11/18/2019 6:47 AM

LEAD PLAINTIFF INCENTIVES

1975

reality.260 The buying and selling of legal claims is entirely
commonplace. Examples include assignment of contract claims,
companies acquiring legal claims by merger, effective transfer of claims
to insurance companies via subrogation, purchasing claims out of
bankruptcy, transfer of claims appurtenant to property (including
intellectual property), and effective “sale” of a large portion of claims to
attorneys in the form of a contingency fee.261 As we have noted:
In many, if not most of these everyday scenarios, the driving economic logic is the same:
the transfer of claims to parties who—via greater expertise, economies of scale, ability to
diversify away risk, etc.—can vindicate the underlying legal rights more effectively and
thus make the claims more valuable, benefiting the claim seller and purchaser alike.262

To that, we might add that where effective litigation furthers public
policy purposes like improved deterrence and compensation—as it does
in representative litigation—profit-motivated claim transfer also works
to better further those purposes.
CONCLUSION
The traditional model of representative litigation is one where
the plaintiffs’ attorney is the indispensable party and the lead plaintiff
is a mere cog, largely interchangeable with the rest of the class. In many
contexts, no doubt, this model is largely accurate, and unavoidably so.
In some settings, however, it is possible—indeed, likely—that a strong
lead plaintiff could play a vital role in successfully identifying and
litigating class claims. In particular, many corporate or securities
claims will involve difficult questions of valuation or extremely complex
webs of contractual arrangements that will be beyond the practical
ability of nonspecialist plaintiffs’ attorneys to comprehend on their
own.263 As a result, an expert lead plaintiff may be vital in identifying
a claim and crafting a complaint in the first place, and vital in
managing the ongoing litigation to enforce the claim.264
We argue that lead plaintiffs who provide meaningful expertise
or shoulder financial risks on behalf of the class should be rewarded for
doing so in the same way attorneys are, rather than simply being
260. See Nagareda, supra note 32, at 1496 (evaluating distaste for profit-driven litigation and
concluding “that the time is at hand for the law to move beyond . . . feigned shock and toward a
more delicate job: that of grappling overtly with the on-the-ground financial implications of the
litigation machine that the law itself has created”).
261. Korsmo & Myers, supra note 52, at 314.
262. Id. at 315.
263. See, e.g., MBS ‘Putback’ Investors Target Big Issuers, supra note 218 (noting, in the
context of mortgage-backed security putback litigation, that it is “far from easy money” and that
“it requires considerable manpower to pore over detailed loan files in search of flaws”).
264. See supra Section III.F.
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reimbursed. In addition, limitations on awarding lead plaintiffs a
percentage of the class recovery should be eliminated. And we argue
that specialist litigation investors should be embraced rather than
stigmatized. This approach would better promote the deterrence and
compensation goals of aggregate litigation.

